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Abstract 
An emergency preparedness planning process model and emergency preparedness 
planning process map were created based upon the pandemic planning process 
implemented by a large Midwestern health system. The emergency preparedness 
planning model and process map can be used to assist researchers, practitioners, and 
health care professionals of large and small health care centers in emergency 
preparedness planning preparations. The pandemic planning process implemented by the 
health system was examined to determine best practices regarding emergency 
preparedness planning. Research and theory from the fields of organizational 
development, federal disaster planning, and injury prevention were surveyed to determine 
the proper planning procedures for the health system pandemic outbreak. From a review 
of the literature, six critical planning criteria were determined to be important for an 
effective disaster planning process: the determination of environmental factors, proper 
problem definition, proper problem specificity, generation of multiple solutions, 
evaluation of solutions prior to implementation, and the inclusion of a feedback loop. 
Data collection utilized survey responses and document reviews to help build the 
emergency preparedness planning model and process map.  
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A pandemic is a global disease outbreak that occurs when a disease emerges for 
which people have little or no immunity and for which there is no vaccine (Toner & 
Waldhorn, 2006). The disease can spread rapidly from person to person and subsequently 
sweep across the world in a short amount of time. The world has witnessed several 
human pandemics in the 20th century. Death tolls for these pandemics range from more 
than 34,000 in 1968-1969 to upwards of 675,000 in 1918-1919 in the United States 
(CDC, 2009). The number of Americans that may die during the next severe influenza 
pandemic is estimated at between 200,000 and 2 million (CDC, 2009).  
 Thirty influenza pandemics have occurred in the past 400 years, three of which 
have been in the past century (Toner & Waldhorn, 2006). The largest of these three 
pandemics was the “Spanish” influenza of 1918-1919, which is estimated to have 
claimed more than 20 million lives worldwide (Ghendon, 1994). One outbreak that 
occurred in the 21st century was the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). SARS 
swept across the world causing more than 8,000 people to become sick which led to more 
than 700 deaths (CDC, 2009). Each year, numerous disease outbreaks happen all around 
the world. When and where disease outbreaks happen can be unpredictable and the 
spread of disease can occur rapidly. Recent pandemics have spread across most 
continents within a six-month period (Cockburn, Delon, & Ferreira, 1969). Because of 
the magnitude of sickness and death, health care systems can experience challenges to 
provide both preventive and primary care. 
 The H1N1 influenza virus is an example of an outbreak that has challenged health 
care systems. The signs of H1N1 flu virus in humans include high fever, cough, sore 
throat, runny or stuffy nose, body aches, headache, chills, and fatigue (CDC, 2009). 
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Illness with 2009 H1N1 flu virus ranges from mild to severe. Most people who have had 
H1N1 flu virus recover without needing medical treatment, but some hospitalizations and 
deaths from infection with the virus have occurred.  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) estimated that between 173,000 and 362,000 H1N1-related 
hospitalizations occurred between April and December 12, 2009 (CDC, 2009). 
Additionally, the CDC estimated that between 7,880 and 16,460 H1N1-related deaths 
occurred during this same time period (CDC, 2009). Because most people did not seek 
diagnosis of their flu-like symptoms, the actual number of H1N1 illnesses is likely much 
higher than the reported data on 2009 H1N1 flu virus.  
 It is necessary to use more precautions with pandemic outbreak than would be 
used with other disasters. Unlike natural disasters, terrorist events, malicious acts, or 
technological disasters, a pandemic is likely to be greater in scale and duration (Cameron 
& Rainer, 2003).  Traditional disasters typically have limited time durations of a number 
of days, while a pandemic usually lasts for months on end. As was noted with SARS, “an 
important distinction between the SARS outbreak and other disaster response situations 
was the likely duration of the problem” (Cameron & Rainer, 2003, p. 411). As a result of 
the long-term effects of pandemic disasters, few organizations will be unaffected from 
the potential sickness-related absenteeism that may result from a pandemic event. Within 
the health care setting, one of the most important challenges faced by organizations will 
be the staffing shortage due to sickness and absenteeism. 
The overall objective of this study is to gain insight into the pandemic staffing 
process of a large Midwestern health system and to determine what portions of theories 
from organization development and disaster planning are useful for future emergency 
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                      5 
preparedness planning, to determine when the theories are not useful to emergency 
preparedness planning, and to provide suggestions for improvement to the planning 
theory. The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic provides the researchers an opportunity to 
observe organizational theories in practice. 
Staffing a Health Care Facility During a Pandemic 
 The inherent nature of the pandemic disaster in particular has been shown to 
impact staffing issues (Krajewski, Sztajnkrycer, & Baez, 2005). Krajewski et al. (2005) 
reported 98% of staff were willing to help after an airline disaster, 76.4% were willing to 
help after a radionuclide event, and 60.9% were willing to work after an infectious agent 
scenario. Therefore, staffing a health care organization during an infectious agent 
scenario like a pandemic is likely to be a difficult and important task facing hospitals and 
health centers. 
Shortages of staff may be intensified by the possibility that more health care 
professionals than people in the general public will become ill (Hampton, 2007).  
Another possibility noted by Hampton (2007) is that some health care workers may fear 
exposing themselves to infectious patients. Toner and Waldhorn (2006) conducted 
several studies from which they concluded that up to 50% of workers would be afraid to 
come to work during a pandemic outbreak. Additionally, Cameron and Rainer (2003) 
report:  
In an infectious disease outbreak this situation may last for months, so calling 
back staff and working double shifts is not a solution. There is also a possibility 
that staff may be unable to work because of infection. Detailed contingency plans 
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for specialist nurses and doctors to supplement ICU and the ED should be in 
place. (p. 411)  
Measures should be taken at hospitals and health centers to ensure that an appropriate 
staffing plan is developed for a potential outbreak of pandemic influenza. 
Federal Emergency Management Programs 
 In disaster planning, emergency management teams are created at both the 
national and local level. At the national level, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) exists to support the preparation, protection, responses, recovery, and 
mitigation of all hazards (FEMA, 2009). Within FEMA, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) has been developed to assist in incident management. The 
NIMS is a systematic nationwide approach to incident management that can be used in all 
sectors of industry by public and private organizations (FEMA, 2009). At the local level, 
many communities have created emergency planning committees that exist to support 
similar aims as FEMA.  
Given that many emergencies involve a dramatic increase in the need for medical 
care, most hospitals and health centers also establish their own emergency planning 
efforts. Hospitals and health centers receive emergency management planning guidance 
from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). 
JCAHO exists to accredit hospitals and health care organizations. Many state 
governments require JCAHO accreditation as a condition of licensure to operate in the 
state. The standards upon which hospitals are judged include but are not limited to: 
human resources, medical staff, emergency management, infection prevention and 
control, and national patient safety goals (JCAHO, 2009). One of the areas that hospitals 
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must be surveyed in is emergency management. Thus, hospitals must ensure that 
emergency management protocols are up to JCAHO standards in order to receive JCAHO 
accreditation. 
Planning Theory 
The correct and precise development of a disaster plan is essential to the 
hospital’s ability to run smoothly during a disaster situation. Before a disaster strikes, 
hospitals have a multitude of plans to run the day-to-day operations of a hospital. In the 
event of a disaster, the plans created for day-to-day operations are not likely to be able to 
accommodate the disaster. Accordingly, in the event of a disaster, hospitals must have 
specific disaster management plans.  
In order to determine how disaster management plans should be created, planning 
research and theory from Organizational Development literature was surveyed to 
understand proper planning procedures to be applied to the potential hospital staffing 
challenge. A selection of the Organizational Development planning theory literature 
appears below. 
Both classic and modern theories can be applied to the potential H1N1 Influenza 
staffing problem to help solve problems and create solutions. The theories described 
below are different strategic planning theories in Organizational Development (Deming, 
1982; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965) and injury prevention (Haddon, 1968). After brief 
descriptions of the theories are provided, the theories are applied to emergency planning. 
These models are used to evaluate the pandemic staffing planning process at the host 
organization of this research study.  Subsequent to the model explanations is a review of 
the specific planning processes that have been developed for health care emergencies. 
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                      8 
Deming’s Process Improvement Cycle 
 This process improvement cycle is commonly known as the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA) cycle. Walter Shewhart, the statistical process control expert, originally 
developed the cycle in the 1930s (Shewhart, 1939). The cycle was popularized and 
promoted by the quality control expert William Edwards Deming in the 1950s. Due to the 
popularization of the cycle by Deming, the cycle is commonly referred to as Deming’s 
PDCA cycle. The PDCA cycle can be used in organizations for problem solving as well 
as for process improvement. The cycle emphasizes that improvement processes must start 
with mindful planning (Deming, 1982). 
The four main phases of the cycle are: Plan, Do, Check, and Act (see Figure 1). 
All problems and processes should start in the planning phase. In this phase, the 
organization plans to improve the process by determining what is wrong with the process 
as it stands and create plans to solve these problems. Once the plan has been created, the 
organization moves into the “Do” phase. As opposed to implementing the changes on a 
large scale, changes described in the planning phase are first put into action on a small 
scale.  This provides the opportunity to move into the third phase of the PDCA cycle that 
Deming referred to as the “Check” phase. During the “Check” phase, the organization 
evaluates whether the small-scale changes have achieved the desired result. During this 
stage, if the changes did not produce the desired result, the organization should start back 
at the planning phase of the cycle. If changes did produce the desired result, the 
organization can move into the final stage of the cycle, the “Act” phase. During the “Act” 
phase, the changes are implemented on a larger scale. 
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It is important to note that PDCA cycle is a continuous process. Once the changes 
have been made in the “Act” phase, the organization moves back into the “Plan” phase of 
the PDCA cycle. This process should be continually repeated, with the completion of 
each cycle bringing the organization closer to achieving their ultimate goals (Deming, 
1982). 
In the event of emergency preparedness planning, the first phase, “Plan”, is the 
longest and most effortful phase of the process because the plan to be developed has great 
levels of complexity. Considering the complexity of the staffing pandemic plan to be 
developed for the health system, the organization may be in the first phase for months. 
Because of the nature of a pandemic, it is unknown when, and even if a pandemic will 
occur. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the hospital would be able to complete all steps 
of the PDCA process. In terms of pandemic planning, the PDCA may be used as a 
general guideline or reminder to check the plan before it is fully implemented, but lacks 
the degree of specificity needed in creating and describing a pandemic planning process. 
Problem Solving: Kepner-Tregoe 
 Charles Kepner and Benjamin Tregoe developed the Kepner-Tregoe problem 
solving process in the 1960s. This problem solving process relies on a structured 
methodology for gathering information, and then prioritizing and evaluating that 
information. The purpose of the Kepner-Tregoe model is not to find the perfect solution, 
but rather develop the best possible solution by minimizing negative consequences of all 
possible solutions (Kepner & Tregoe, 1965). 
 When using the Kepner-Tregoe method, there are four basic steps to problem 
solving (see Figure 2). The first step is a situational appraisal, which involves clarifying 
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the present situation and outlining concerns. After the situation has been clarified, the 
next step is problem analysis. This step involves defining the problem and determining its 
root cause. Following a thorough problem analysis, a decision analysis is completed. 
During decision analysis, alternative solutions to the problem should be identified. Each 
of the alternative solutions should undergo a risk analysis to determine potential benefits
 and risks to each possible solution. The final step in the Kepner-Tregoe model is 
Potential Problem Analysis, which involves choosing the best of the alternatives and 
continuing to conduct a more in depth risk analysis. The solution should be further 
investigated for other potential problems and negative consequences. Once a thorough list 
of problems has been identified with the best solution, actions and plans should be 
designed that propose to minimize the risks associated with the best solution. The best 
alternative solution should then be ready to be implemented within the organization 
(Kepner & Tregoe, 1965).  
The Kepner-Tregoe model of problem solving and decision making has been 
generally accepted throughout the business community as a useful way to solve 
organizational problems. Because of the detail-oriented stages, the Kepner-Tregoe 
method is useful within the setting of pandemic planning. The first step of the Kepner-
Tregoe model is situational appraisal. During situational appraisal, the present situation is 
outlined. This is critical in pandemic planning, because current resources must be 
gathered and developed, as well as determining the capacity levels the hospital will 
operate at. Another part of this phase is “outlining concerns.”  This is a major part of 
pandemic planning, because hospital staff will want to be ready for as many situations as 
possible (Krajewski et al., 2005; Hampton, 2007). 
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The next step of the model is concerned with a clear definition of the problem, 
which is essential to emergency management planning as well as pandemic planning in 
particular. In pandemic planning for a hospital, it is likely that there will be additional 
problems that a hospital will face as well as the original problem. Each of these problems 
will need to be identified and reconciled in order to achieve the greatest likelihood of 
plan success.  Each additional problem must be evaluated to determine how it affects the 
original pandemic planning problem, and whether or not the additional problem should 
be included in the analysis of the original problem. If it is determined that the additional 
problem will affect the original problem, then the additional problem should be included 
in the larger planning process. If the additional problem is determined to have an 
insignificant effect on the original problem, it should not be included in the larger 
planning process. For example, the additional problem of bed availability is likely to 
affect the pandemic planning process, thus should be included in the planning for the 
original problem of pandemic planning. 
Following a problem analysis, the decision analysis phase begins. Alternative 
solutions are generated and critiqued in terms of benefits and risks to the organization. It 
is essential to the plan’s efficacy that a team of trained professionals from a variety of 
perspectives carefully evaluates solutions in the health system so that many possible 
outcomes can be anticipated before the pandemic arrives. 
Once alternative solutions have been generated, one solution is chosen to 
implement. According to Kepner and Tregoe (1965), the final solution should undergo 
one final review of benefits and risks to the organization before implementation. Once 
this final review has occurred, the solution is ready for implementation.  
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The Kepner-Tregoe model of problem solving is useful to a health care system 
attempting to create an emergency preparedness plan because of the high level of detail 
that goes into scrutinizing benefits and risks to solutions, as well as proper problem 
definition. The Kepner-Tregoe model lacks health-care specific planning steps, such as 
the differences of needs and plans of individual departments within the hospital. 
The Haddon Matrix: Pandemic Preparedness Planning 
The Haddon Matrix was developed in 1968 as an analytic approach to traffic 
safety and injury prevention (Haddon, 1968). Following its original application to traffic 
safety, the matrix was applied in the field of epidemiology; more specifically, injury 
prevention. The current version of the Haddon matrix is based upon the social-ecological 
framework of Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979). Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) theory is based upon 
the definition of various levels of the social environment, and creates a distinction 
between intrapersonal factors, interpersonal factors, institutional elements, and cultural 
elements. It is from these factors and elements that the current version of the Haddon 
matrix originated from. 
One advantage of the Haddon matrix is its ability to take a complex problem and 
dissect the problem into smaller parts, therefore allowing for individual factors of the 
complex problem to be analyzed in terms of how the small parts affect the problem 
before, during, and after an event (Runyan, 2003). The matrix has been applied to 
different industries and health care settings to reduce morbidity and mortality from a 
variety of different injury types. In addition to its use in the injury prevention field, the 
Haddon Matrix has recently been applied to the field of emergency planning and 
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pandemic preparedness to create planning matrices to assist in preparedness processes 
(Barnett et al., 2005; Tiwari et al., 2006). 
 The matrix consists of four columns and three rows. The rows represent different 
phases of an injury or event (pre-event, event, and post-event), while the columns 
represent different factors that influence the injury. The factors that are in the columns 
represent the epidemiological factors of personal factors, agent/vehicle, physical 
environment, and social environment (see Figure 3). The personal factors column refers 
to the person or persons at risk of injury. The agent or vehicle of the injury represents 
how the person becomes injured. According to Haddon (1968), the agent or vehicle of 
injury affects the host through an object, person, or another animal/organism. When 
applied to pandemic planning, the agent column was purposely omitted because of its 
inability to add in the success of planning at an institutional level (Barnett et al., 2005; 
Tiwari et al., 2006). The physical environment refers to factors of the setting where the 
injury occurs that contribute to the occurrence of the injury. Finally, the social 
environment represents the socio-cultural and legal norms of a community, such as laws 
and regulations that may affect the occurrence of the injury. 
Each cell of the matrix contains individual factors and important information 
relevant to each cell. For example, the Social Environmental Factors/Pre-Event cell is 
filled with various items pertaining to laws, regulations, and socio-cultural norms of the 
society that are pertinent to be aware of before the pandemic occurs. Regarding pandemic 
planning, the Social Environmental Factors/Pre-Event cell would contain the statement: 
high levels of fear in the community surrounding 2009 H1N1 Influenza virus. 
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The plan does not address any feedback loops, as do the organization 
development plans (Deming, 1982; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965).  Both Deming’s (1982) 
PDCA Cycle and the Kepner-Tregoe model of problem solving (Kepner & Tregoe, 1965) 
provide evaluation steps that allow for revisions and further strengthening of the plan. In 
comparison, the Haddon Matrix is easily applicable to the health care setting, and 
provides a great deal of specificity in each of the cells, but lacks the critical component of 
a feedback loop to evaluate the plan. 
 A completed matrix allows the user to determine potential risk and protective 
factors for injury, or pandemic, in each cell (Runyan, 2003). Consequently, plans can be 
created with measures that address each of the factors within each of the cells. Thus, the 
matrix provides functionality because of its ability to identify strategies to prevent and 
respond to injuries, or pandemics, at each cell of the matrix (Runyan, 2003). 
 As noted by Barnett et al. (2005), each phase of a public health emergency 
constitutes a new set of challenges to curtail in response and readiness efforts. The 
Haddon matrix provides a high degree of specificity that can be used at each phase of a 
public health emergency. Once all cells of the Haddon matrix have been completed, each 
cell represents specific task-oriented items that can be designated and delegated to 
appropriate personnel to solve that particular problem. Therefore, when applied to 
pandemic planning, the Haddon matrix provides the necessary adaptability to be applied 
at different phases of an emergency response.  
In addition, the Haddon matrix fosters efficiency of resource allocation (Barnett et 
al., 2005) by the ability to focus on the appropriate phases of the response effort. The 
multi-cell structure of the Haddon matrix allows for the determination of when different 
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factors will become important for the organization to manage. In comparison to the other 
models, this is a unique attribute of the Haddon matrix. 
 Although the Haddon matrix was originally created for use in the injury 
prevention field, the Haddon matrix has been successfully applied to address 
preparedness for influenza pandemic in nursing units (Tiwari et al., 2006), as well as to 
SARS response planning (Barnett et al., 2005).  
Barnett et al. (2005) applied the matrix to Thailand’s H5N1 planning efforts. 
Although no efficacy data were reported, Thailand’s past efforts of pre-event planning 
were evaluated in the study conducted by Barnett et al. (2005). From the Haddon matrix 
created, opportunities for further enhancements of the pandemic planning system were 
noted. For example, during the analysis of pre-event socio-cultural factors, the authors 
noted the importance of political and social willingness to report disease dissemination 
(Barnett et al., 2005). The authors noted that initially, the Thai government was criticized 
for ineffective communication strategies concerning the H5N1 influenza. Thus, from the 
application of the matrix, the authors were able to determine that future pandemic 
planning efforts should attempt to create strategies to allow more effective governmental 
communication concerning H5N1 influenza.    
Additionally, the Haddon matrix was applied to pandemic influenza planning in 
Israel (Barnett et al., 2005). The authors discovered that one of the personal event factors 
of pandemic preparedness determined important to Israel was focused on training 
activities for health care professionals. Israeli officials had noted elsewhere that health 
care workers were well trained in terrorism related emergencies, but received little 
training on pandemic preparedness. Hence, through the use of the matrix, the authors 
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were able to determine the importance of proper pandemic preparedness training to the 
effective handling of a pandemic influenza. 
Consequently, the Haddon matrix provides the degree of specificity necessary for 
an emergency preparedness plan, as the matrix has done in the past. The matrix will 
allow the steps of each part of an emergency event to be planned, from before the event 
happens to after the event has occurred.  
Hospital Emergency Preparedness: NIMS & ICS 
The NIMS process was developed by the federal government to provide a 
standardized approach to assist government departments and agencies in effectively 
managing critical incidents. The processes determined by NIMS are supported and 
carried out through the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS is one of three 
standardized organizational structures established by the NIMS. The ICS is a 
management system used by many public safety professionals to assemble and carry out 
systems at a wide range of emergencies (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). The NIMS process 
requires operations to be performed in accordance with ICS regulations.  
 The incident management system is used as part of the response to a disaster. 
Compliance with NIMS is a condition for any health care organization receiving federal 
assistance, including grants and contracts from such agencies as the Human Resources 
Services Administration (HRSA), the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality 
(AHRQ), and the CDC. Throughout the NIMS compliance process, ICS is incorporated 
into the hospital’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and standard operating procedures 
(SOPs).  
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The preparedness component provides useful information to hospitals and health 
centers that are in the plan development phase of emergency preparedness planning.  As 
stated by the NIMS system, “Preparedness is achieved and maintained through a 
continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and 
taking corrective action” (FEMA, 2009). All stages of the cycle should be followed in the 
correct order so that the incident can be properly managed. 
The NIMS process is used by hospitals and health centers to assist in disaster 
planning development. The process is flexible in design structure and size, and may be 
used at small as well as large institutions (FEMA, 2009). There are multiple components 
to the NIMS system, including provisions to help with preparedness, communications 
and information management, resource management, command & management, and 
ongoing management and maintenance. 
ICS is put into action by first identifying an Incident Commander, who serves as 
the leader of the Incident Command team. Following the selection of an incident 
commander, the planning process begins.  The incident planning process consists of six 
steps (FEMA, 2009): 
1. Understand organization policy and direction 
2. Assess incident situation 
3. Establish incident objectives 
4. Select appropriate strategy or strategies to achieve objectives 
5. Perform tactical direction (apply tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning 
the right resources, and monitoring their performance) 
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6. Provide necessary follow-up (changing strategy or tactics, adding or 
subtracting resources) 
The program emphasizes the development of Incident Action Plans (IAPs) during 
the NIMS process. The IAP can be oral or written, and should mirror the overall strategy 
for managing the incident within a specified timeframe. Within the IAPs, clear incident 
objectives should be clarified. In addition to the specifications discussed, many other 
topics of incident planning are discussed, such as: communications planning, transfer of 
command, mobilization, and information and intelligence management (FEMA, 2009). 
Summary 
The NIMS process comes from the disaster management framework, providing 
steps aimed at preventing and curtailing disasters and thus represents the emergency 
management portion of the theories presented. The models proposed by Deming (1982) 
and Kepner and Tregoe (1965) represent theories based upon organizational decision 
making processes and organizational change. The organizational development models 
provide necessary input into the determination of how a plan should be implemented 
from an organizational perspective. The critical component of the organizational 
development theories is the inclusion of feedback loops. Neither the Haddon Matrix nor 
NIMS explicitly describe feedback processes.  
The Haddon matrix attempts to understand and solve pandemic planning 
problems from the background of injury prevention. The level of detail that results in 
each cell from the Haddon matrix is necessary when evaluating a pandemic planning 
process. Unlike the organizational development theories and the NIMS process, the 
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Haddon matrix allows for the creation of specific steps and problems to be addressed 
throughout the resolution of the problem.  
The NIMS planning process emphasizes proper problem definition, and is similar 
to Kepner-Tregoe in this way. At the end of the NIMS process, the final step allows for 
follow-up after plan enactment. Although the NIMS process does not provide a feedback 
loop, the follow-up step serves a similar purpose. In conclusion, each of the frameworks 
discussed provide useful information for pandemic planning, but also come with 
downfalls. The important and unique parts of each of the different frameworks should be 
used to effectively evaluate a pandemic planning response.   
This research presents a case study that was completed on the 2009 H1N1 
influenza planning preparations completed at a large health system.  The purpose of this 
study is to examine the step-by-step staffing pandemic planning process implemented by 
the health system. This research reflects the process that occurred for the staffing 
pandemic planning process, rather than the overall pandemic planning process that 
occurred throughout the health system. The planning process is evaluated in terms of fit 
to the models discussed above. In order to evaluate the proposed pandemic planning 
method, portions of each theoretical framework are assessed for their inclusion in the 
planning method at the health system of study. The portions of the framework that are 
included for assessment of the pandemic planning process were determined by 
interpreting the important and unique parts of each of the processes discussed above. The 
plan created by the health system of study is evaluated on inclusion and completion of the 
following planning criteria determined by the researcher: 
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A) Determination of Environmental Factors (Haddon, 1968): The status and 
potential impact of the environmental factors surrounding the problem is assessed before 
planning begins. 
B) Proper Problem Definition (FEMA, 2009; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965): The 
problem is clearly defined and understood by all members of the problem solving 
process. All members of the problem solving process agree upon the same definition of 
the problem, as well as the surrounding parameters describing the problem. 
C) Proper Problem Specificity (FEMA, 2009; Haddon, 1968): The problem is 
described in enough detail that there is no ambiguity concerning the boundaries of the 
problem. Additionally, the problem is properly specified so that it is not viewed as too 
broad or lacking focus. 
D) Generation of multiple solutions (Kepner & Tregoe, 1965): More than one 
solution to the problem, or a part of the problem, is developed prior to decision making 
upon a final solution. 
E) Evaluation of solutions prior to implementation (Deming, 1982): Solutions are 
reviewed for problems prior to implementation. 
F) Inclusion of feedback loop (Deming, 1982; FEMA, 2009; Kepner & Tregoe, 
1965): Individuals involved in the planning process receive feedback on planning 
solutions prior to implementation. The feedback is used to revise planning solutions. 
Method 
Participants 
Relevant subject matter experts in emergency planning and pandemics at the 
health system completed online surveys regarding plan development and review over 
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time. This research was approved by Appalachian State University’s Institutional Review 
Board # 10-0089 (see Appendix A). All survey participants contacted by the researcher 
completed an informed consent form (see Appendix B). In addition, an agreement letter 
of participation was signed by the health system that outlined assurances of 
confidentiality of data, and anonymity of employee interview responses (see Appendix 
C). All employees surveyed were referred to only by job title. 
Setting 
 The study was conducted at a large Midwestern health system. The health system 
included numerous hospitals and health centers, a medical school, and nursing school. At 
the time this study was completed, the health system had 930 total licensed beds, 
performed around 45,000 surgeries each year, employed approximately 19,000 
individuals, and had an operating expense of roughly 1.8 billion dollars (University of 
Michigan Health System, 2009).  
The health system was structured such that the Executive Vice President for 
Medical Affairs was the head of the health system. At the health system, a Director and 
Chief Executive Officer reported to the VP. Under the supervision of the Director and 
Chief Executive Officer were 11 directors of smaller categories within the health system. 
The job titles were: Patient Care & Nursing Services, Hospital & Ancillary Operations, 
Ambulatory Care Services, Clinical Affairs, Medical Center Information Technology, 
Human Resources, Quality Improvement, Financial Services, Chief Compliance Officer 
& Privacy Director, Chief Medical Information Officer, and Associate Dean & Director 
of Graduate Medical Education. The individual director roles were insignificant to the 
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purposes of this study, but are provided as further information to assist in the explanation 
of the structure of the health system. 
In the event of an H1N1 pandemic, the hospitals and health care centers of the 
health system estimated between 30-40% of the staff would not come to work. In 
addition, patient volume levels were estimated to increase upwards of 30% for a severe 
pandemic situation. Thus, the hospital was forced to create a pandemic plan for staffing 
the health system during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza. 
The health system’s Incident Command team convened for the first time in March 
2009. At the meeting, it was determined that it was necessary to create Pandemic 
Planning teams to effectively coordinate the pandemic response effort. The Incident 
Command team, lead by the Incident Commander, selected individuals to become leaders 
of the Pandemic Planning teams. The Incident Command team created 21 Pandemic 
Planning teams, each in charge of one aspect of the pandemic planning process. The 
Pandemic Planning teams established were: Data Modeling, Scarce Resource Allocation, 
Emergency Department Triage, Pandemic Urgent Care, Outpatient Capacity, Inpatient 
Capacity, Respiratory Care, Home Care, Mortuary Services, Chain of Command, 
Communication, Departmental Business Continuity Plans, Education, Employee Health, 
Employee Mental Health, Infection Control, Laboratory, Pharmacy, Patient Support, 
Staffing, and Supply (see Figure 4). Each pandemic planning team lead was responsible 
for identifying individuals that were integral to their particular pandemic team, and 
recruited these individuals to become members of that team. Once each pandemic 
committee team lead identified individuals to join their pandemic committees, each 
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pandemic committee convened to generate solutions to the tasks delegated to the 
associated Pandemic Planning team.  
Materials and Procedure 
Throughout the planning process, Pandemic Planning teams created planning 
documents to assist in the execution of the pandemic plan. Principle subject matter 
experts that were integral parts of developing and revising the plan completed online 
surveys regarding plan development and review over time. As previously noted, this 
research focused on the staffing pandemic team planning process that occurred. As a 
result, the document review and survey of managers reflect the process that occurred 
specifically for the staffing pandemic planning process as opposed to the health system 
pandemic planning process. 
Naturalistic observation by principle investigator. Prior to the possible 
pandemic outbreak, the researcher attended meetings and assisted in the planning process 
of the pandemic staffing committee. The researcher took notes, provided suggestions, and 
created planning documents for the pandemic staffing committee. 
Survey of managers. Surveys were administered to subject matter experts within 
the staffing pandemic team. The survey generated responses that described the steps 
taken behind the plans and provided additional insight into the planning process. Survey 
questions sought to allow the researcher to understand what involvement subject matter 
experts had with the creation of the plans, what challenges were faced with plan 
development and implementation, if the critical planning criteria occurred, and if subject 
matter experts had any suggestions for improvement. The survey questions were 
generated based upon the previously defined critical planning criteria (see Appendix D). 
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Critical planning criteria were developed based upon evidence from the literature 
regarding essential elements to effective planning processes (Deming, 1982; FEMA, 
2009; Haddon, 1968; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965). Survey questions prompted respondents 
to state explicitly whether or not each critical criterion occurred during the planning 
process at the health system. Additionally, questions were developed and revised with the 
input of the Staffing Team Lead.  
Pandemic committee job titles of subject matter experts that completed the survey 
were: 
• Human Resources Systems Lead 
• Staffing Team Lead 
• Administrative Lead 
• Volunteer Team Lead 
• Nursing Services Lead 
• Supply & Equipment Management Lead 
• Project Manager of Staffing Pandemic Team 
Document reviews. Planning documents were obtained for the overall pandemic 
plan as well as the staffing pandemic plan. The broad level planning documents described 
the steps taken to ensure that the health system could continue to run properly during a 
pandemic. The documents showcased how the plan was developed around a theoretical 
model of disaster planning, and described each of the steps in the plan. The planning 
documents obtained represent the completed pandemic plans, rather than planning 
documents created and used during the planning process. Therefore, the documents 
reviewed through the analysis provide an indirect route by examining the final pandemic 
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documents created by the health system; the researcher was able to infer the steps that 
occurred during the planning process.  The planning documents reviewed were:  
• Intake Script (Appendix E): Script created to assist individuals processing 
requests for additional staff. Outlines the steps necessary to determine the number 
and type of staff needed. 
• Labor Pool Operations (Appendix F): Describes the duties of the Human 
Resources labor pool operation and the different duties to be completed during 
each phase of pandemic alert. 
• Matching Process (Appendix G): Provides direction concerning the steps of the 
matching process of relocating individuals to short-staffed departments in need of 
employees. 
• Human Resources (HR) & Labor Pool Pandemic Operations (Appendix H): 
Specifies the duties of the Human Resources and Labor Pool Pandemic 
Operations team. Duties of this team include the continuance of critical Human 
Resources functions, operating the organizational labor pool, and coordinating 
organizational staffing and personnel reporting. 
• UMHS Pandemic Planning Staffing & Labor Pool (Appendix I): A conceptual 
process map of the staffing labor pool communications and redeployment process. 
• Emergency Management Event: Describes the simulation exercise completed by 
the health system. The document is structured such that each objective of the 
pandemic planning process is defined; following each element are the strengths, 
weaknesses, and strategies to change the element for future planning purposes. 
For example, one objective described in the document is the security operations. 
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Strengths, weaknesses, and suggestions for improvement are provided for this 
element, as well as a contact person and deadline to complete revisions to the 
plan. For the purposes of this research, this internal document was not available 
for reproduction. 
• Department Specific Staffing Plan: Specifies the duties of a specific department. 
Duties are categorized according to whether they are critical, intermediate, or 
non-essential to the functioning of the department, especially in the event of a 
disaster. According to the classification of each job duty within the department 
and the level of the disaster, departments can use the business continuity plan to 
determine the tasks to be completed in the event of a disaster. For the purposes of 
this research, this internal document was not available for reproduction. 
• Task Calendar: Assigns and defines tasks of the pandemic plan to Staffing Team 
individuals based upon urgency level. For the purposes of this research, this 
internal document was not available for reproduction. 
• HR Pandemic Operations Roster: Lists each individual employee of the Human 
Resources Department; specifies working capabilities to determine redeployment 
opportunities in the event of an emergency event. For the purposes of this 
research, this internal document was not available for reproduction. 
Results 
The pandemic planning process enacted by the health system was evaluated on 
inclusion and completion of critical planning criteria based on Deming’s PDCA Cycle 
(1982), Kepner and Tregoe’s Problem Solving Cycle (1965), Haddon’s Matrix (1968), 
and the NIMS emergency planning process (FEMA, 2009): 
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• Determination of Environmental Factors 
• Proper Problem Definition 
• Proper Problem Specificity 
• Determination of Multiple Solutions 
• Evaluation of Solutions Prior to Implementation 
• Inclusion of Feedback Loop 
Each of the critical planning criteria were systematically assessed using survey 
responses, document reviews, and personal experience to determine the extent to which 
the pandemic planning process created by the health system conformed to the critical 
planning criteria. The survey responses, document reviews, and personal experiences 
were applied specifically to the staffing pandemic plan as opposed to the overall 
pandemic plan created by the health system.   
Process mapping: sequentially depicting the critical criterion within the 
planning process. First, a best practice emergency preparedness planning model is 
proposed based upon the critical criteria. Subsequently, the best practice emergency 
preparedness planning model is described in further detail in the form of a process map. 
The steps of the proposed planning process are sequentially depicted to illustrate the steps 
in the process, and to provide more detail on how the process occurred. The proposed 
emergency preparedness model and process map reflect the process that occurred 
specifically for the staffing pandemic planning process, rather than the overall pandemic 
planning process that occurred throughout the health system. 
Survey analysis.  The survey responses from subject matter experts were 
incorporated into the analysis as quotes representing single statements around a process 
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step (see Tables 1-6).  Relevant statements were evaluated based upon their description of 
critical planning criteria; statements from survey participants were cited to provide 
evidence of the process step in the health system’s planning. No statements were found 
that did not effectively represent one of the critical planning criteria. 
Document analysis. Documents created by the health system were reviewed and 
evaluated against the planning process as well. The documents were created as a result of 
the planning process that occurred and provided an archive of the decisions made and 
processes developed. The statements referenced planning activities that can be inferred to 
have happened during the planning itself. 
For example, the HR & Labor Pool Pandemic Operations document provided 
evidence of proper problem specificity in that it detailed operating assumptions used by 
the health system. During the creation of the document, steps similar to the following 
occurred: meetings were held to discuss what should and should not be considered an 
operating assumption, operating assumptions were chosen, evaluated, elaborated upon 
and finalized. Therefore, the details contained within the HR & Labor Pool Pandemic 
Operations document exist because the planning process contained problem specificity 
steps. It was through the inferences mentioned above that critical process steps were 
determined to have occurred during the health system’s planning.  
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model 
Based upon analyses of the survey and documents, an emergency preparedness 
planning model was created for the health system pandemic planning process. The model 
is a high level description of the process that was used during the pandemic planning at 
the health system, and is based on the theories and federal guidelines previously 
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discussed (Deming, 1982; FEMA, 2009; Haddon, 1968; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965). Each 
of the six critical criteria were included and serve as the framework for the six major 
phases of the proposed emergency preparedness planning model (see Figure 5). The 
major phases of the emergency preparedness planning model are briefly introduced 
below, followed by a detailed explanation of each in the context of the process map. 
Anticipate. Planners should gain a thorough understanding of the environment 
surrounding the problem in order to properly anticipate issues that must be considered 
prior to plan development. In the course of this phase, environmental and organizational 
factors of the incident situation are assessed. This step addresses Haddon’s (1968) 
determination of environmental factors. 
Boundaries. Planners should clearly define the problem to be solved and set 
boundaries as to what does and does not encompass the problem. Incident objectives and 
assumptions should be established during this phase. Additionally, the problem should be 
described in enough detail so that there is no ambiguity concerning the boundaries of the 
problem. This step addresses the need to have proper problem definition (FEMA, 2009; 
Kepner & Tregoe, 1965) and proper problem specificity (Haddon, 1968; FEMA, 2009). 
Create solutions. This phase enacts steps to create solutions whereby multiple 
solutions are considered to solve the problem. Kepner and Tregoe (1965) emphasized the 
importance of the generation of multiple solutions as noted by the critical criterion, 
generation of multiple solutions. This phase is complete when one solution is selected as 
the final solution; this solution continues to be developed during the Design phase. 
Design. During this phase, the solution is designed. Additionally, planning 
documents and data collection documents are created. 
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Execute. The plan is executed when implemented. The formal execution of the 
plan takes place in the event of a pandemic or other emergency event. Deming (1982) 
notes the importance of plan evaluation prior to actual execution of a plan and suggests 
that plans should be evaluated on smaller scales prior to widespread implementation. 
Therefore, when there is no pandemic or other emergency event, simulation exercises 
should be executed.  
Feedback. During and after the execution phase, the plan is evaluated to provide 
feedback for improvement. Strengths, weaknesses, and suggestions for improvement 
should be created and the plan should be revised. This step requires the inclusion of a 
feedback loop (Deming, 1982; FEMA, 2009; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965) in order to perfect 
the plan. 
Although the feedback phase is placed in the model after the execution phase, 
feedback occurs throughout the planning process. Thus, the model contains arrows from 
each step in the process to the feedback phase indicate the continuous relationship with 
the other phases. 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Process Map 
An Emergency Preparedness Planning Process Map was created based upon the 
model and conclusions from the critical planning criterion analysis (see Figure 6). The 
process map illustrates when and how critical planning steps should occur. Each step of 
the process map corresponds with a phase of the emergency preparedness planning 
model.  
The process map is divided into five rows to represent the different levels of the 
organization involved in the planning process. The first row considers the environmental 
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factors of the planning process. Environmental factors describe current attributes, 
external and internal to the health system, as they relate to the emergency event. 
Environmental factors considered include certain epidemiological data elements, JCAHO 
guidelines, federal emergency preparedness guidelines, and other existing emergency 
planning documents internal to the health system. The second row involves actions and 
decisions within the Command System including the actions of the Incident Commander 
and the Incident Command team. The third row involves actions, decisions, and 
documents generated through pandemic committees where decisions are ultimately made. 
Examples of these committees include Outpatient Capacity, Inpatient Capacity, 
Communication, and Staffing. The fourth row includes the actions that occur at the 
department level. Examples of departments include the Emergency Department, 
Pathology, Materiel Services, and Human Resources. For the purposes of this process 
map, most actions at the departmental level are concerned with providing feedback to the 
committees rather than generating solutions to the problems. The generation of the 
solution occurs at the committee level, with feedback provided by the departments. The 
final row on the process map describes the improvement process. Steps within this row 
are concerned with changes and revisions that occur during the planning, execution, and 
feedback process. 
In order to correctly interpret the process map, it is important to keep several 
things in mind. The process map is read starting in the top left of the map, with the 
“Assess Epidemiological Data” box. Each shape is connected to another shape by an 
arrow. Arrows represent movement; they direct the reader to the next step in the process. 
Each shape represents a different step in the process that must occur in order for the 
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following step to occur. Rectangular boxes represent actions, such as completing a 
simulation exercise. Boxes with a curved line on the bottom represent documents; these 
steps indicate that a document is created during that particular step. Parallelogram shapes 
on the process map represent where process data is collected, displayed, and analyzed. 
The diamonds on the process map represent decisions where the answer directs the user 
to the next step in the process map.  
Each letter on the process map corresponds to the same letter from the Emergency 
Preparedness Planning Model. Numbers combined with the letters suggest different steps 
within that process phase.  Thus, each letter and number combination is a description of 
the events that occur during the corresponding step.  What follows are descriptions of 
steps within each phase of the Emergency Preparedness Planning Model along with 
evidence from the document analysis and survey responses to describe how the health 
system planners engaged in these steps. 
Anticipate.  
A: Assess environmental/organizational factors of incident situation. During the 
first phase of the planning process, the Incident Command team assessed environmental 
and organizational factors of the incident situation. The type of information gathered 
during this phase includes information regarding levels of staff absences, current supply 
levels of protective equipment, and disease outbreak level in both the community and 
worldwide. 
A1: Federal emergency preparedness guidelines. The government assists in 
emergency management and planning efforts by providing guidelines and information 
regarding emergency preparedness. These documents must be consulted during plan 
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development. Documents to reference include documents from the FEMA, more 
specifically the ICS and NIMS processes. The guidelines documents specify the steps 
necessary to successfully implement the NIMS system, which includes the 
implementation of the ICS. The ICS team serves as leadership during an emergency 
event, and holds decision-making power throughout the incident. Following the ICS 
activation, federal planning documents guide health systems to effectively coordinate a 
response to an emergency event. 
A strong emphasis was placed upon NIMS standards and other federal guidelines 
by the planning staff at the health system. As noted by the Administrative Lead, the 
“entire planning efforts contemplated ICS as an overarching management tool. We went 
into a limited activation of our Incident Management System in June 2009, to effectively 
manage our continuing response” (Table 1, Entry 1). Similarly, the Staffing Team Lead 
noted the chain of command structure originations from the NIMS system: 
The main element of NIMS we used was the concept around central command 
and control. We discussed how information should flow and how the Staffing 
Team Lead needed to ensure that sufficient data/information was relayed to them 
so they could appropriately interact with the Incident Commander or Disaster 
Command Center accordingly. (Table 1, Entry 2)  
Several other survey responses provided support for the use of federal emergency 
preparedness guidelines (Appendix D); five of seven respondents unconditionally agreed 
that federal guidelines were used. The other two respondents did not use the guidelines in 
their planning, however they agreed that individuals at a higher level of the planning 
process likely used the guidelines.  
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A2: JCHAO guidelines. JCAHO guidelines should be consulted and referred to 
during plan development to ensure compliance with JCAHO standards. Landesman 
(2005) discusses the importance of meeting JCAHO standards in emergency situations 
such that, “hospitals must meet expected standards for comprehensive emergency 
management as part of their accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Health care Organizations.” In order to receive and maintain accreditation, JCAHO 
specifies six critical areas of emergency management that hospitals must be proficient: 
communications, supplies, security, staff, utilities, and clinical activity (JCAHO, 2009). 
Consequently, hospitals and health systems must ensure compliance with JCAHO 
standards during emergency preparedness planning in order to continue to receive 
JCAHO accreditation. 
A3: Epidemiological data. Data elements that determine the level of threat posed 
by the emergency event must be collected in order to anticipate the effects of these 
elements on health system processes and functionality during an emergency situation. 
Data elements include data from the Centers for Disease Control regarding current 
outbreak levels at the local, national, and worldwide level, and the percentage of staff at 
risk of infection.  
Several different forms of epidemiological data were gathered by the health 
system. The Project Manager of the Staffing Pandemic team discussed the types of data 
used in the planning process: 
The IMS group used various sources of information, including Subject Matter 
Experts from UM, national groups like the CDC and OSHA, state/local groups 
like MIOSHA and the Health Department, professional groups like nurses and 
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physicians associations, practices from peer institutions, general public news 
sources like New York Times, CNN, etc. to understand the environment. (Table 
1, Entry 3) 
The Staffing Team Lead provided support for the previous statement and the use of 
external environmental factors in planning: “we carefully evaluated how the community 
was reacting to the pandemic by reading newspapers, watching the news, etc.” (Table 1, 
Entry 4). 
The Labor Pool Operations document divided operations according to three 
different phases: Pre-Phase, Limited Phase, and the Full Phase (Table 1, Entry 10). The 
three different phases of the Labor Pool Operations document were determined based 
upon the current influenza phase reported by the CDC, the number of patients at the 
health system with H1N1 or flu-like symptoms, the number of staff absent, and the 
number of departmental requests for additional staff. 
A4: Internal environmental/organizational factors. In addition to external 
epidemiological factors monitored by the health system, the effects of internal factors on 
the health system were also considered. Examples of internal factors monitored by the 
health system included: potential for school closings, supply levels of protective 
equipment, current and future staff absence levels, and the number of patients with H1N1 
or flu-like symptoms. The Administrative Lead of the pandemic staffing committee 
noted, “the potential for staff absences was also considered as a potential issue. High 
daily census in hospital facilities also posed major challenges” (Table 1, Entry 5). The 
Supply and Equipment Management Lead noted similar concerns over a decrease in 
staffing numbers (Table 1, Entry 6).  
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The Staffing Team Lead listed a number of internal environmental factors 
considered during the planning process such as, “Staff fears of contracting H1N1 and 
simply not showing up to work. The 80%+ female population in our environment who 
are primary caregivers at home, so sick children and/or closed schools could significantly 
affect our capabilities” (Table 1, Entry 7). The knowledge of the relatively high 
population of female staff helped the planning team anticipate an increased staff shortage.  
Documents created as a part of the final pandemic plan discussed actions that 
inferred the determination of environmental factors during the first phase of the planning 
process as well as during the emergency event. The Task Calendar document determined 
which job tasks should be completed and when job tasks should be completed based on 
the pandemic planning urgency level (Table 1, Entry 11). The pandemic planning 
urgency level was a metric specifically created by and for the Payroll section of the 
Human Resources department of the health system, and was not used by any of the other 
pandemic planning committees. The pandemic planning urgency level was determined 
based upon the number of individuals in the department able to complete job tasks. For 
example, when three to four individuals were available to complete job tasks, the 
document specified only three of the ten original job tasks to be performed. 
Finally, The Intake Script document (Appendix E) provided instructions for 
employees regarding staffing needs during a pandemic to obtain “background on the 
situation that caused the need” (Table 1, Entry 12). In order to make the proper request 
for more staff, the script prompted the individual to understand the environmental factors 
surrounding the situation gained during the Anticipation phase of the process. 
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A5: Emergency planning documents. Planning documents and plans previously 
created by the health system should be reviewed to assist in future plan development. 
Referring to planning documents created in 2006 for the SARS outbreak, the 
Administrative Lead discussed the use of prior planning documents on the pandemic 
planning process, “having the prior planning from 2006 was very valuable. Even though 
imperfect, the efforts provided a good basis from which to refine existing plans to better 
ones” (Table 1, Entry 8).  
The Business Continuity Plans developed in 2006 for the SARS outbreak 
provided the groundwork for further plan development. When asked what components of 
the planning process worked well, the Volunteer Lead discussed the use of business 
continuity plans, “I can’t believe we didn’t have these before” (Table 1, Entry 9). The 
business continuity plans were developed in order to determine the essential and non-
essential tasks performed by each department. Once each department created a list of 
critical tasks performed, the plans were used to determine the critical functions necessary 
to continue in the event of an emergency event, as well as those functions that were not 
essential to continue operations at the health system.  
Boundaries. The second phase of the process is concerned with creating 
boundaries to properly define and specify the problem. 
B1: Properly define the problem. The first part of this phase is proper problem 
definition, which involves creating a defining statement of the problem that all members 
agree upon. At the health system of study, problem definition included determining the 
possible severity of the pandemic, and the problems that may arise as a result of the 
pandemic.  There were numerous occurrences within the planning process that problem 
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definition occurred in order to define a smaller subset of the original problem. The HR & 
Labor Pool Pandemic Operations document provided a defining statement to place 
parameters around the role of labor pool operations: 
The purpose is to coordinate HSHR Labor Pool operations in the event of an 
emergency event such as a pandemic. In the event of the emergency, HSHR 
would be responsible for business continuity of existing critical HR functions, 
operating the organizational labor pool, and coordinating organizational staffing 
and personnel reporting. (Table 2, Entry 3) 
The survey responses provided two examples of proper problem definition that 
occurred during the planning process. The Project Manager of the staffing pandemic team 
stated, “For purposes of the staffing plan, we clearly defined the problem as how to 
maintain essential operations while facing a potential 40% absenteeism rate” (Table 2, 
Entry 1). Similarly, when asked what steps occurred during the planning process, the 
Nursing Services Lead identified one of the steps as “identify the problem to be solved” 
(Table 2, Entry 2).  
B2: Properly describe the problem. The second part of the phase, proper problem 
specificity, has occurred when the problem is described in enough detail that there is no 
ambiguity concerning the boundaries of the problem. Additionally, the problem is 
properly specified so that it is not viewed as too broad or lacking focus. Document 
analysis yielded three examples of specifying the problem during the planning process.  
The Labor Pool Operations document described the steps taken to deploy external 
volunteers to work assignments within the health system. According to the document, the 
steps of the process were, “Security and Screening, In-Processing, Medical Station, 
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Orientation, Training, and Deployment” (Table 2, Entry 8). The specificity of the external 
volunteer deployment process described in this document allowed labor pool intake staff 
to be knowledgeable of the correct process to properly assign and deploy external 
volunteers to a work assignment within the health system. 
The Intake Script planning document provided guidelines to employees taking 
staffing requests from units such as “ask questions regarding background, education and 
coaching, order detail, prioritization, take order, conduct matching” (Table 2, Entry 9). 
The specificity of these questions allowed intake staff to make well-informed conclusions 
regarding the needs of unit requests for additional staff. 
The Department Specific Staffing Plan document described the job tasks, skill 
level required to perform the job tasks, and work redesign and redeployment strategies of 
the job tasks within a specific department (Table 2, Entry 10). The document was to be 
completed by all departments within the health system so that each department had an 
individualized emergency preparedness staffing plan. The details provided described the 
critical and non-critical job tasks within each Department Specific Staffing Plan; this 
allowed the Incident Command team, and the department itself, to assess the emergency 
readiness of the department. 
Similarly, four survey responses provided support for the proper problem 
specificity criterion. The Project Manager of the staffing pandemic team discussed the 
use of detail in plan development, “planning for the pandemic required thinking outside 
the box and preparing to behave in ways we are not used to behaving. This required a lot 
of communication and detail to help people think differently” (Table 2, Entry 4). The 
Supply and Equipment Management Lead noted the inclusion of details in the plans 
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created for departmental operations, “the documents we prepared for how we would 
manage our operations were very detailed and then we got into specifics about how 
departments could collaborate to ensure continued service to our patients” (Table 2, Entry 
5). Along these lines, the Project Manager of the staffing pandemic team stated: 
We provided a lot of detail to the institution to frame the situation. This allowed 
staff to understand what we were preparing for and how we were preparing. 
Planning for the pandemic required thinking outside the box and preparing to 
behave in ways we are not used to behaving. This required a lot of 
communication and detail to help people think differently. Many new guidelines 
had to be developed and others had to be modified to guide behavior. (Table 2, 
Entry 6) 
B3. Establish incident planning principles and assumptions. Following the 
completion of the proper problem definition and description steps, the health system 
created incident planning principles and assumptions. The incident principles and 
assumptions represented a list of critical planning premises created by the health system. 
The assumptions were used as a framework of the critical elements for individuals to 
keep in mind during the upcoming solution generation and design phases. A list of six 
principles and three working assumptions were created for staffing pandemic planning 
purposes. The Staffing Team Lead noted, “we divided the work into departments and 
created planning principles” (Table 2, Entry 7). The planning principles created were 
(Appendix D): 
• Not business as usual. 
• Plans should leverage existing resources and mechanisms. 
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• Redeployment of staff should be done in a tiered manner. 
• Redeployment of staff will be balanced between the critical needs of your 
own department and the critical needs of other departments. 
• Staff with clinical skills should be utilized in some clinical capacity. 
• Internal staffing will be approached differently than external/volunteer 
staffing. 
The corresponding working assumptions used for staffing pandemic planning 
purposes were (Appendix D): 
• Actual presentation of a pandemic may not be known in advance. 
• Event is expected to be protracted with 12-week waves over several years. 
• Staff absenteeism estimated at 30-40% due to sick staff, staff caring for 
family members, or fear of infection can be expected. 
The planning principles and assumptions created by the health system allowed for 
proper boundaries to be placed upon the problem. Moreover, the creation of planning 
principles and assumptions minimized confusion concerning the scope of the problem. 
By creating boundaries to the problem and properly defining the problem, the health 
system was able to effectively establish parameters to surround the problem.  
Create solutions. More than one solution to a problem should be developed prior 
to making a final decision. During the brainstorming phase that occurred at the health 
system, a variety of solutions to the pandemic staffing problem were discussed. 
C1: Generate multiple solutions per element. This process occurred at the 
committee level. Committees engaged in brainstorming sessions to create multiple 
solutions to the problem. Additionally, committee members solicited feedback of the 
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multiple solutions from the relevant departments and the committee revised the plan 
according to this departmental feedback. 
Unfortunately, documents used during the planning process that described 
occasions of generation of multiple solutions were not available for the purposes of this 
research. The researcher attended meetings during which the generation of multiple 
solutions occurred. Meeting notes of the staffing pandemic committee supported the 
occurrence of the generation of multiple solutions. These notes were not available to the 
researcher for the purposes of this research. During meetings of the staffing pandemic 
committee, several ideas were discussed regarding the most effective way to recruit 
external volunteers during a pandemic. Several individuals suggested the use of a pre-
existing health system volunteer network. Other individuals advocated for the recruitment 
of external volunteers from other area health care facilities. Still other individuals 
presented the option of external volunteer recruitment through a classified newspaper 
posting. This example supports the occurrence of the generation of multiple solutions in 
regards to external volunteer recruitment. 
C2: Obtain feedback from key constituents. This step involved retrieving 
feedback on potential solutions from key constituents in relevant hospital departments 
integral to the planning process. Committee members asked subject matter experts in 
departments, usually department chairs, to evaluate the solution developed and provide 
constructive feedback on how to improve the plan. The feedback came in two forms: a 
meeting between the committee member/s and the subject matter expert from the 
department, or through an email from the subject matter expert to the committee 
member/s. The Volunteer Lead stated that, “the meetings I attended were filled with a 
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constant back-and-forth of feedback and ideas” (Table 3, Entry 1). Feedback received 
was then shared with other members of the committee who then discussed the importance 
of the feedback and decided through consensus to incorporate the feedback received and 
revise the solution to reflect these suggestions. 
C3: Choose one solution to continue to develop. Following feedback from key 
constituents, one solution was chosen. Committee members held meetings to determine 
which solution was ultimately chosen. At the meetings, all committee members were free 
to voice their opinions both in favor and not in favor of proposed solutions. In order to 
arrive at the most effective solution, the committee chair reminded the committee 
members of the planning assumptions and principles upon which the health system 
operated under, as well as current environmental and organizational factors surrounding 
the pandemic. The committee chair reminded committee members of this information to 
ensure that the solutions were considered based upon all relevant information so that 
members chose the best solution for the problem. 
Discussion ensued upon the solutions until a consensus was reached upon which 
solution to choose to develop. Within the staffing pandemic committee, decisions were 
made by consensus, with the committee chair holding veto power. Once one solution 
reached consensus by the committee, committee members began work to aggressively 
develop the chosen solution. 
For example, the staffing pandemic committee created a number of solutions to 
recruit external volunteers. Discussion ensued upon the solutions to this problem, and 
individuals voiced support and concerns for the different solutions. Following this 
discussion, one solution was chosen. The strategy that was chosen unanimously by the 
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staffing pandemic committee was to use the pre-existing health system volunteer network 
as the external volunteer recruitment strategy. 
Design. This phase of the process is concerned with the design of the solution. 
The solution should be created in as much detail as possible. 
D1: Incident action plan documents created. Planning committees created 
planning documents to assist in the execution of the pandemic staffing planning process. 
These documents were based upon the solutions developed during the previous phase of 
the planning process. The purpose of the documents created was to aid in the 
implementation of the IAPs in the event of disaster occurrence.  
One such document was the Pandemic Planning Staffing & Labor Pool document 
(see Appendix I) created by the staffing pandemic committee wherein the staffing 
planning process was depicted in the form of a process map (Table 4, Entry 3). The map 
detailed the steps that should occur in the event of a disaster. Standards for 
communication and reporting, the use of business continuity plans, communications 
coordination with the Incident Command team, and an overview of the Labor Pool 
operations process were depicted on the map. 
 In order to document solution development, each department created IAP 
documents. IAPs specified the actions that occurred within each department in the event 
of the enactment of Incident Command mode. Each department listed the tasks and duties 
that occurred within their department during day-to-day operations. Then, each task or 
duty was ranked in terms of criticality: critical, intermediate, or non-essential. In the 
event of an emergency, critical tasks were to be completed first, followed by intermediate 
tasks, and lastly the non-essential tasks. The Department Specific Staffing Plan 
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represented a non-final version of a departmental IAP (Table 4, Entry 4). The finalized 
IAPs are discussed in later steps (see Step D3). 
D2: Data collection plan created. In addition to the IAP, a data collection plan 
should be created to track progress and evaluate the effectiveness of the plan during and 
after the execution phase. This plan should detail what data elements the organization 
wishes to collect regarding the implementation and review of the plan.  
The health system created plans to collect the following data elements: 
• Patient volume measures: The number of beds filled in each hospital compared to 
the number of open beds. 
• Percent of patient census being treated for H1N1 or flu-like symptoms: The 
number of patients being treated for non-H1N1 or flu-like symptoms compared to 
the number of patients being treated for H1N1 or flu-like symptoms. 
• The number of staff absent each day because of the H1N1 flu virus versus other 
causes: The number of staff absent daily specified for the reason of H1N1 or flu-
like symptoms was compared to the number of staff absent daily for any other 
reason. 
• The number of staff available for redeployment: Consisted of the number of staff 
available for redeployment to other departments. 
• The number of departments in need of assistance: Consisted of the number of 
departments in need of additional staff to complete job tasks. 
• Amount of staff not working in their regular assigned department/job role: 
Consisted of the number of staff not working in their regular assigned 
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department/job role compared to the number of staff working in their regular non-
pandemic assigned department/job role. Percentages were calculated for each. 
• The number of services offered by department: Consisted of the number of 
services offered by each department. 
• The number of people that volunteer through the external labor pool for 
redeployment: Comprised of the total number of people that sign up to volunteer 
through the external labor pool. 
• The number of external labor pool volunteers that are sent to work in the hospital: 
Consisted of the number of external labor pool volunteers that volunteered to 
work and were then sent to work in the hospitals. Data was also collected on the 
departments and level of specialization job that the volunteer was placed into. 
As completed by the health system, a wide range of information was surveyed by 
these data elements. Emergency preparedness plans should include plans for the 
collection of data across a wide variety of categories as was completed by the health 
system. 
D3: Continually reevaluate the solution. In addition to feedback solicited by 
committee members from subject matter experts within departments, solutions were 
reevaluated during the design phase. The Human Resources Systems Lead described a 
variety of efforts to evaluate solutions, “we identified limitations of the system we chose 
and continued to reevaluate those as we moved through the process” (Table 4, Entry 1).  
The Administrative Lead discussed the use of feedback in a portion of the revised 
plan that was created to include a patient placement algorithm, “we found a need to 
circulate the draft more broadly, and received additional anticipatory feedback from those 
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                    47 
not yet affected by the actual placement changes” (Table 4, Entry 2). Undoubtedly, the 
committee member solicited feedback from subject matter experts in order to design the 
most effective solution, providing support of the occurrence of feedback on solutions. 
D4: Final incident action plan created. The final IAP has been created once the 
simulation exercise is completed (discussed later in step “E1”). These documents 
represent the finalized and authorized plan of action.  
The final staffing IAP created by the health system was represented by the HR & 
Labor Pool Pandemic Operations document (Appendix H). This document coordinated 
all Labor Pool operations in the event of an emergency event, such as a pandemic (Table 
4, Entry 5). The staffing pandemic committee created the final plan, with assistance from 
departmental subject matter experts and adapted the plan based on data from the 
completed simulation exercise. 
D5: File incident action plan for future use. Once the Final IAP is created, the 
plan should be appropriately stored and filed for use, whether this is anticipated in the 
near or in the distant future. At the health system of study, the final IAP was filed with 
the health system’s emergency management specialist, as well as with the Staffing 
Pandemic Lead. These two individuals stored both electronic and hard copies of the final 
version of the IAP, and were responsible for providing the Incident Command team with 
the final IAP. 
Execute. The pivotal step in the process is the implementation of the IAP either 
as a simulation or actual pandemic event.  
E1: Complete simulation exercise. A simulation exercise should be completed 
following the creation of the finalized IAP. The simulation exercise should include all 
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departments and individuals integral to the implementation process. During the exercise, 
the plan should be simulated to understand the outcomes and consequences that follow 
each step in the process. For example, individuals integral to the planning process 
convened in one location to complete a “tabletop” exercise where they discussed the plan 
from the first step through the last step. At each step, each individual was given the 
chance to voice their concerns over the step as well as provide suggestions for 
improvement.  
Several survey responses noted that the “tabletop” exercise provided support for 
the evaluation of solutions prior to a potential implementation. The Human Resources 
Systems Lead discussed the “tabletop” exercise: “the final meeting was a run-through of 
the process and how to use the system by doing a sample order and match process” 
(Table 5, Entry 1). Likewise, the Staffing Team Lead discussed the evaluation of 
solutions critical criterion in terms of the “tabletop” exercise: “We performed tabletop 
exercises on our pandemic staffing process to test our process and assumptions, and 
identify strengths and weaknesses in our plan” (Table 5, Entry 2). The result of the 
“tabletop” exercise was revised IAPs. The data generated by the simulation provided the 
health system with relevant feedback regarding the plan’s potential effectiveness. 
E2: Simulation data. Data should be collected in order to capture the findings of 
the simulation exercise. In the “tabletop” exercise, the staffing pandemic planning 
committee chair took notes and created a feedback document. This document was not 
available for the purposes of this research. These data concerning the pandemic plan were 
then used to improve and revise upon the IAPs (see letter “F”).  
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                    49 
E3: Conduct training. Training must be conducted before the core of the IAPs 
can be implemented. The content of the training programs should be predetermined and 
designed in accordance with the final IAPs. The health system created a separate 
pandemic training committee that oversaw and designed all training operations and 
content for the pandemic event (Table 5, Entry 3). Regardless of whether training is 
developed in a separate committee or developed by each committee, training must occur 
prior to the execution of the IAPs so individuals are able to perform the job tasks and 
duties required during an emergency event. 
E4: Alert communications committee to begin execution of plan. The ICS is 
activated when the health system is posed with an event that threatens the day-to-day 
operations of the health system. The Incident Commander holds the authority to 
determine when the Incident Command Center is activated and deactivated. When such 
an emergency event occurs, the communications committee is alerted by the Incident 
Commander to begin the execution of the IAPs. At the health system, the pandemic did 
not reach a level in which plan implementation was necessary. If it had, the Incident 
Commander would have alerted the communications committee to contact all pandemic 
committee leaders and instruct them to begin execution of IAPs. Following the start of 
plan execution, pandemic planning committee leaders would provide updates on plan 
implementation to the Incident Command Team. 
Feedback. The execution phase of the planning process is followed by a formal 
feedback phase. During this phase, the finalized IAPs should be formally evaluated and 
improved upon. As previously discussed, the feedback phase also occurs informally 
throughout the planning process.  
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At the health system, feedback occurred during the Create Solutions phase where 
feedback is obtained from departmental subject matter experts. Additionally, the Staffing 
Team Lead noted the use of feedback during the “tabletop” exercise. When asked 
whether planners received feedback, the Staffing Team Lead responded, “yes, via the 
tabletop planning process” (Table 6, Entry 1). Similarly, during the creation of IAPs and 
the completion and evaluation of the simulation exercise, departmental subject matter 
experts and committee members provided feedback to the committees who then revised 
the IAPs. The Volunteer Lead stated, “the meetings I attended were filled with a constant 
back-and forth of feedback and ideas” (Table 6, Entry 2). 
F: Formally evaluate and improve incident action plan. Evaluation methods to 
evaluate IAPs can differ. Organizations may choose to use surveys to assess member 
experiences or perceptions of the plan’s effectiveness. Additionally, organizations can 
review collected event data to determine the plan’s effectiveness, or hold focus group or 
town hall meetings to assess organizational member’s response to the plan. There are 
certainly many other evaluation options. 
The staffing pandemic plan at the health system was formally evaluated following 
the completion of the finalized IAPs. The feedback phase occurred at the health system in 
the form of a formal evaluation of the IAPs. The resulting Emergency Management Event 
document detailed the objective, accomplishments, challenges, and improvements for the 
several hundred tasks that were simulated in the IAPs (Table 6, Entry 3). Individuals who 
were integral to the planning process assisted in revisions of the IAP by contributing 
feedback to the Emergency Management Event document. The document represented a 
feedback loop in the health system planning process. 
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F1: Develop post event reports. During the evaluation process, the proceedings of 
the actual events and the results of data evaluation should be recorded so the findings can 
be used to revise the plan for future use. Once the reports have been created, they are also 
filed away for use in future planning efforts.  
The health system completed a post event report titled “Emergency Management 
Event.” This document was not available for reproduction for the purposes of this 
research. In this document, the health system created an archive of the events that 
occurred during the pandemic planning process. Over one hundred “objectives” were 
identified and outlined in terms of accomplishments, challenges, and improvements to be 
made in the future for the specified objective. For example, one of the objectives was 
concerned with the Labor Pool objective. Accomplishments of the Labor Pool objective 
included the “creation of planning principles and working assumptions,” challenges of 
the Labor Pool objective included, “we struggled with figuring out who we needed to 
even be in the conversation around developing processes,” and finally, improvements of 
the Labor Pool objective included, “ensure the principles are still applicable for future 
planning.” As a result, each objective was summarized, and suggestions for improvement 
were noted for future plan revisions. 
Overall conclusions 
The process that was observed at the health system involved continual re-
evaluation of problem definitions, solution generations, and feedback loops. It is likely 
that this occurred because the health system developed the plan quickly in reaction to a 
looming potential H1N1 pandemic. If the health system had had the time to engage in 
proactive planning, the problem definition, solution generation, and feedback loop 
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processes would have been likely to be more streamlined and systematic. Given the just 
in time circumstances of the health system planning, the health system effectively defined 
the problem, generated multiple solutions, and used feedback loops concurrently. 
Rather than planning just in time as the health system was forced to, hospitals and 
health systems should plan proactively for emergency management events.  They should 
create an emergency preparedness plan before the threat of an emergency event exists. 
Despite the just in time planning that occurred, the observed planning process at the 
health system provided an example of the steps necessary in order to effectively plan for 
an emergency event.  
 
Discussion 
The pandemic planning process created by the health system effectively acted on 
the original six critical planning criteria discerned from the literature. The emergency 
preparedness planning model and process map created by this research can enhance the 
emergency preparedness planning processes at large and small health systems.  
The emergency preparedness planning model allows for flexibility in the planning 
process in that the model can be used to plan for a variety of emergency events faced by 
health care centers. Although the planning model and process map were created based 
upon the pandemic planning process that occurred at one health system, the model was 
designed to be used for all emergency management disasters that face health care centers. 
Planning processes at different health care centers are admittedly different. For 
example, the size and location of health care facilities play a key role in the emergency 
preparedness planning process. Accordingly, the proposed emergency preparedness 
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planning model and process map were designed to allow for flexibility in planning. 
Rather than determine specifics surrounding plans for a particular type of emergency 
event faced by health care centers, the resulting model and process map focused on 
describing the steps necessary to effectively plan for an emergency event. 
The resulting planning model and process map were backed by theory and created 
based upon a case study analysis. The proposed model and process map were created 
based upon critical planning criteria determined from established planning theory. The 
planning model and process map were partially validated by the review of the case study 
of the health system’s pandemic planning process. Health care professionals can use the 
model (see Figure 5) and process map (see Figure 6) as a step-by-step process to guide 
emergency preparedness planning. 
At the time this research was originally proposed, the researcher speculated that 
two separate planning processes would be created: one process to describe the planning 
process that occurred at the health system, and one process to describe the ideal and 
proposed planning process for emergency preparedness planning. Surprisingly, the 
process used by the health system provided a good representation of an ideal planning 
process, with minor revisions. Therefore, only one planning process was described. 
It is important to note that the scope of this research project was focused primarily 
on the staffing plan created by the health system as opposed to the overall pandemic plan 
created by the health system. To this end, the system maps reflected the process that 
occurred specifically for the staffing pandemic planning, rather than the pandemic 
planning that occurred throughout the entire health system. By focusing only on the 
staffing pandemic planning process, the researcher was able to thoroughly investigate the 
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planning process that occurred. This level of detail would not have been possible if the 
focus had been on the pandemic planning process of the overall health system. However, 
the process used for the other pandemic planning areas of the health system was similar if 
not identical to the staffing pandemic planning process. 
Difficulty arose concerning various federal guidelines recommendations during 
the planning process. As noted in the Emergency Management Event document, the CDC 
and World Health Organization recommendations for care did not always coincide with 
literature suggestions for care. The difference in recommendations created uncertainty 
and confusion in terms of which guidelines to follow. In the future, an integrated set of 
guidelines from governmental agencies regarding health care emergency management 
would ensure a smoother planning process. 
Limitations 
Despite the potential addition to the field of emergency preparedness planning 
this research represents, several limitations exist. First, planning should occur before an 
event takes place, as opposed to right before or during the event. The planning process 
that occurred at the health system was reactionary as opposed to proactive; planning 
occurred as a reaction to the imminent threat of widespread pandemic outbreak. Several 
survey responses indicated the limitations to the reactionary planning that occurred 
within the health system. Many survey participants commented on the importance of 
beginning the planning process before the event occurs. These respondents indicated that 
there was not enough time to plan effectively. When asked about challenges that were 
faced during the planning process, the Staffing Team Lead stated, “I just simply felt that 
there was not enough time to devote to all of the issues” (Appendix D). Additionally, the 
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Administrative Lead stated, “the combination of the rapidity of developments, together 
with the large and complex nature of our organization made this process imperfect, and, 
at times, solutions had to be rolled out and tested immediately, with adjustments made 
after the fact” (Appendix D). These responses highlighted the importance of planning for 
an event before it occurs as opposed to planning when the event occurs.  
Another potential limitation may have been personal bias. The researcher was a 
part of the planning process, which had both positive and negative outcomes on the 
research. A positive outcome of this was the enhanced ability to provide additional detail 
to descriptions and easily understand the survey responses of participants.  Conversely, 
the researcher may have had personal biases that affected the outcomes of the research. 
The limited amount of data may also have affected the robustness of the 
evaluation. The researcher was unable to conduct quantitative analyses of the planning 
process because the pandemic plan was never fully implemented. A review of 
quantitative data to determine plan effectiveness and efficiency (see D2 for a list of 
effectiveness measures) would provide a useful extension of this research. 
Similarly, although the researcher had access to a large number of documents that 
were used in the planning process, a number of additional documents existed that were 
used in the planning process which the researcher was unable to obtain. The documents 
that the researcher was able to gain access to represented the completed plans to be used 
in the event of a pandemic. This provided a less than optimal amount of qualitative data 
in regards to the planning process. Meeting notes, minutes, and agendas described the 
planning process in ways that were not captured by the documents to which the 
researcher had access. For example, meeting notes of the staffing pandemic committee 
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described multiple solutions to external volunteer recruitment. Documents that contain 
such data could improve future research efforts. 
A final limitation of this research concerns the nature of the research itself. The 
research methodology was qualitative as opposed to quantitative in nature, thus making it 
difficult to provide validation measures of each planning criteria. Furthermore, the 
research was conducted at one health system as opposed to a number of health care 
facilities; findings may not be fully applicable to other health care centers.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
More data should be collected throughout all phases of plan development. If 
possible, data should be obtained before, during, and after the emergency preparedness 
planning process. Data elements to be collected should include both quantitative and 
qualitative elements. Quantitative data elements should include efforts to assess the 
effectiveness of the plan on organizational outcomes such as the number of pandemic 
patients, number of staff redeployed, number of volunteers, number of volunteers 
redeployed, length of the pandemic, when the pandemic plan was implemented, materials 
supply information, and many others (see D2). Qualitative data elements for inclusion 
should be similar to those data elements collected in the survey used for the current 
research (see Appendix D). Additionally, a content analysis should be conducted of 
qualitative items to determine validity. Content analysis was not conducted for the 
purposes of this study because the aim of this research was to propose a streamlined 
emergency preparedness planning process, rather than to determine the reliability and 
validity of survey responses regarding plan development. 
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If future researchers choose to distribute a survey similar to the survey used in the 
present research, a broader range of participants should be utilized. Additional 
respondents to survey include other staff, patients, and volunteers during the emergency 
event. 
As noted earlier, research was conducted at one health care system. Future studies 
should examine additional health care systems to determine the applicability of the 
planning process suggested by this research. Finally, further research should refine the 
proposed emergency preparedness planning model and process, and provide reliability 
and validation studies of the critical planning criteria. 
Conclusion 
 Detailed emergency preparedness planning process proposals were scarce in the 
literature and tended to emphasize the importance of planning without describing how the 
steps in the planning process should occur. The emergency preparedness planning 
process proposed in this current research represents a uniform model that can be used to 
assist health care professionals, researchers, and practitioners in emergency preparedness 
planning efforts. 
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Appendix A 
 
IRB Approval Form 
 
Date: 3/11/2010 
 
RE: Notice of IRB Approval by Expedited Review (under 45 CFR 46.110) 
 
Study #: 10-0089  
Study Title: Staffing a major academic Medical Center during a long term disaster 
 
Submission Type: Modification 
Expedited Category: (7) Research on Group Characteristics or Behavior, or Surveys, 
Interviews, etc. 
 
Approval Date: 3/11/2010 
Expiration Date of Approval: 1/12/2011 
 
This submission has been approved by the Institutional Review Board for the period 
indicated. It has been determined that the risk involved in this modification is no more 
than minimal.  
 
 
Investigator’s Responsibilities:  
 
Federal regulations require that all research be reviewed at least annually. It is the 
Principal Investigator’s responsibility to submit for renewal and obtain approval before 
the expiration date. You may not continue any research activity beyond the expiration 
date without IRB approval. Failure to receive approval for continuation before the 
expiration date will result in automatic termination of the approval for this study on the 
expiration date. 
 
You are required to obtain IRB approval for any changes to any aspect of this study 
before they can be implemented. Should any adverse event or unanticipated problem 
involving risks to subjects occur it must be reported immediately to the IRB.  
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Appendix B 
Informed Consent Form 
 
APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY                                       
 
Informed Consent for Participants in  
Research Projects Involving Human Subjects 
 
 Title of Project: Staffing a major academic Medical Center during a pandemic  
 
 Investigator(s): Ariel Grosshuesch       
   Timothy Ludwig, Ph.D.  ___________  ______ 

 I. Purpose of this Research/Project: 
This research will examine how a major academic Medical Center plans and prepares for 
the onset of a potentially detrimental pandemic outbreak of H1N1 flu. The focus will be 
on determining how the medical center developed its plan for staffing all units and 
departments with employees throughout the health system during the pandemic.  

 II. Procedures: 
Plans regarding the allocation of staff to different departments will be described 
and analyzed as it relates to major disaster planning theory. Following the explanation of 
the plan, the plan will be analyzed in terms of its usefulness to other hospitals and 
medical centers.  
Principle subject matter experts that were integral parts of developing and 
revising the plan will complete an online survey regarding plan development and review 
over time. The survey link will be sent to participants through email. Participants will 
complete the survey once. Completion of the survey should take no more than thirty 
minutes. Participants will be asked to respond to questions regarding the pandemic 
planning process. Completion of the survey will not positively or negatively affect any 
job outcome. Completion of the survey is voluntary, and you have the opportunity to 
withhold information, as well as drop out of the study at any time for no reason. 

 III. Risks: 
• Organizational data and responses to survey items could be sensitive to the 
reputation of the hospital and/or the executives and key planners of the H1N1 
staffing plan.  
 
Institutional Review Board  
Study #: 10-089  

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• Given that only one person holds each surveyed position, other persons at the 
medical center may be able to determine who said what comments. 
 IV. Benefits: 
• Assist in furthering the field of disaster planning. 
• Any information obtained will be published in a scholarly journal to disseminate 
H1N1 planning information to other hospitals and medical centers. 
 
V. Extent of Anonymity and Confidentiality: 
• At no time will the researchers release the results of the study to anyone other 
than individuals working on the project without your written consent 
• Surveyed participants will be recognized by job position; individual names will 
not be used 
• The hospital name will not be used 
• Data will be aggregated (No individual data will be collected or reported) 
 
VI. Compensation: 
 
Participants will not be compensated for completion of this research. It is understood that 
no funds have been set aside for any injury or illness resulting from this project.  
 
VII. Freedom to Withdraw: 
 
Subjects are free to withdraw from a study at any time without penalty. 
 
VIII. Approval of Research  
 
This research project has been approved, as required, by the Institutional Review Board 
of Appalachian State University and University of Michigan Health System. 
 
 
01/13/2010     01/12/2011  
IRB Approval Date    Approval Expiration Date  
 
IX. Subject's Responsibilities  
 
I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I have the following responsibilities:  
 
Review disaster planning staffing plan and answer questions within the online survey 
regarding pandemic planning (Please see attached questions). You are free to not answer 
any questions without penalty. 
 
 
 
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                    64 
X. Subject's Permission  
 
I have read and understand the Informed Consent and conditions of this project. I have 
had all my questions answered. I hereby acknowledge the above and give my voluntary 
consent:  
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________    Date____________________  
Subject signature  
 
 
Should I have any questions about this research or its conduct, I may contact:  
 
Investigator: Ariel Grosshuesch                   Phone: (828) 719-1401    email: 
grosshueschar@appstate.edu 
 
Faculty Advisor: Timothy Ludwig, Ph.D.   Phone: (828) 262-2712     email: 
ludwigtd@appstate.edu 
 
 
           
David Nieman, Ph.D. (IRB Co-Chair)  Phone: 828-262-6318   e-mail: irb@appstate.edu 
 
Graduate School and Research and Sponsored Programs 
Appalachian State University  
Boone, NC 28608  
irb@appstate.edu 
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Appendix D 
Summary of Pandemic Planning Process Survey Responses 
 
Question 4: What was your role in the planning process? 
1. I was the lead for Human Resources Systems. My job was to identify a solution 
(Manpower's PowerBase) and how we could get the solution up and running quickly in 
the event of a pandemic. My role was also to figure out the long-term impact of the 
current system. 
2. I am lead for the staffing team, which has responsibility to develop the plan to ensure 
that the health system has enough faculty and staff available to meet the patient care 
needs in the event of a pandemic. 
3. Since 2006, I have been the Administrative lead for the pandemic planning process. 
4. I assisted with coordinating the Nursing Services staffing response to a pandemic 
event. Specifically, I assisted in the planning and coordination of volunteers and 
temporary paid staff recruited from area schools of nursing (students and faculty), health 
system RN retirees within the past three years, and volunteers who would assist nurses in 
the inpatient areas. Also, I was involved in planning and prescreening of internal health 
system employees with nursing or patient care related background who might be 
reassigned to work in a direct care capacity. My focus was doing any initial contact, pre-
screening and preparation before going to the Nursing Central Staffing Resource 
department for assignment. 
5. I was the Nursing Lead for the Limited Activation Team and for Nursing Services in 
general. 
6. I am the Director of Materiel Services and was responsible for supply and equipment 
management including everything from acquisition to distribution. In addition, I was also 
responsible for working with my team to develop our own Pandemic Plan to ensure our 
continued operation. 
7. I was the Project Manager that assisted the Staffing Planning team. 
Question 5: What are the job titles of other individuals that were instrumental in the 
planning process? What did these individuals contribute? 
1. The Human Resources Consultants helped with their knowledge of what departments 
might request help, and how they would go about filling openings was instrumental! 
They also helped us narrow down a list of skills to use in the system to do our matching. 
 
The Employment Process Coordinators do the hiring for positions now, and their input 
was incredibly important in helping us figure out processes. 
 
The Recruitment coordinators - The Nurse Recruitment and Volunteer Services 
coordinator and her team were instrumental in helping us parse out the different Skill 
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Categories (A, B, C and D). Staff from Central Staffing Resources was able to provide 
insight into their current process and what works well and what does not work well. 
2. The Incident Commander and Associate Hospital Director provided a structure for us 
to understand and discuss the potential scenario we would most likely experience. This 
allowed us to develop some assumptions that we were then able to share with 
departments as we worked to develop potential staffing scenarios and how we might 
manage the process.  
The Emergency Management Specialist helped all the various groups and teams working 
on the project stay connected to one another by placing information on our website. 
Additionally, she made sure we all knew what each other were doing. 
3. The Chief of Staff is a respected physician lead who brought about broad physician 
engagement with the process that led to enhanced success of the planning process. The 
Chief Operating Officer supported funding for my efforts, and supported the time 
investment of others who engaged in the effort. The Chief Operating Officer also 
supported funding of the support position, the Project Manager, who ultimately 
transferred over from Office of Clinical Affairs to Emergency Management to continue 
this and other work. Various physician and administrative leaders who led committee 
work were also instrumental in the planning process. 
4. The nursing lead assisted in the overall coordination of Nursing Service efforts. 
The manager of the Central Staffing Resource department helped me. 
The Director of Nursing Professional Development and Education helped me. 
The Nurse Recruitment and Retention specialist helped me. 
The Educational Nurse Specialist helped me. 
The Human Resources Decision Support manager helped me. 
The Staffing Team lead helped me. 
 5. The Safety Director and Infection Control Leadership, program leadership, Director of 
Materiel Services, Assistant Chief of Staff, Marketing Director, Human Resources 
director and many others helped me. 
I am unable to answer this broad of a question concerning the large number of people 
involved in the health system H1N1 planning. 
6. Naturally, my management team was instrumental and in particular the Manager of our 
Warehouse Operations and the Manager of Patient Equipment was especially helpful. 
Contracts and Procurement was another area that I worked with in particular as we 
developed our reserve order of supplies early in this process. I continued to work with 
Contracts and Procurement as we brought in substitute products and dealt with the 
company representatives. Our Value Analysis team was another group that I worked with 
as they played a key role is assessing and evaluation substitute products. Other areas that 
I worked closely with were Infection Control and Nursing, as I needed their counsel on 
product decisions. Finally, I would note that I worked very closely with our vendors 
including our medical product distributor, Owens and Minor. 
7. The Human Resources Manager, the Safety Management Manager and other Staff, 
Nursing Manager, Operations Manager, Support Services Manager, Infection Control 
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Manager, Volunteer Services Manager, Man-Power Staff, Education Manager, and the 
Process Improvement Specialist helped me during the planning process. 
Question 6: Briefly describe the steps that occurred during the planning process 
1. I met with the Staffing Team lead to help him identify a system. Once we identified the 
system, we walked through the process of how to use the system and make a staffing 
request. We then took that process and an overview of the system to additional Human 
Resources and Recruiting and Staffing professionals to get their insight and input on how 
to streamline the process. 
 
There were numerous ongoing meetings with this large group to continue to streamline 
the system and the process. The final meeting was a run-through of the process and how 
to use the system by doing a sample order and match process. 
2. Once the limited activation of the Incident Command Structure was activated, I needed 
to identify who would need to be involved in the planning process for staffing. I 
Identified individuals from Nursing, Human Resources, Office of Clinical Affairs, 
MLearning, Volunteer Services and other ad hoc members. 
Given our assumptions, we then began to develop a high level process for potential use. 
We then scheduled numerous meetings, and through discussions and work sessions, we 
were able to identify a general process to use for staffing. 
3. When we first heard of the H1N1 threat in Mexico in late April, 2009, we convened 
our previous Pandemic Planning Committee, first by conference call and then 
subsequently in meetings, to prepare for the impact. Planning continued, weekly and 
more often, both in the large group and smaller work groups by area of concern. 
4. Continuing from the list already started in the question:  
4) Make requests for pertinent data needed for next steps (i.e. requesting Human 
Resources Decision Support staff assistance with running a report containing the names 
of all RN staff who retired within the past three years.) 
5) Reviewing data (names submitted from Unit/Department Business Continuity Plans) 
and working with the Staffing Team lead to determine which employees would be 
assigned through Human Resources and which would be assigned through Central 
Staffing Resources.  
6) Review Retiree data and check with the retiree's last nurse manager to get a 
recommendation to call for this work.  
7) Create a list of Schools of Nursing with existing affiliation agreements- and contact 
names and numbers so that letters to faculty and staff could be sent from Nurse 
Recruitment and Retention on behalf of the Chief of Nursing Services asking for 
volunteers or temporary paid staff.  
8) Collaborate with the Nursing Education Department and Central Staffing Resources to 
develop process details for volunteers, temporary staff, and internal staff reassigned. 
5. Identify experts, identify problem to be solved, gather the correct people to assist in 
solving the problem or planning, agree upon recommendation, connect with all 
departments and associated processes to ensure consistency of action to be taken, get 
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feedback from stakeholders, finalize the plan, develop an implementation plan with a 
clear communication process and target dates. The general communication strategy was 
developed and replicated each time the change was introduced. Leadership was charged 
to fan out information to their staff. The Website was utilized as the source of truth. 
6. After the SARS situation of a few years ago, we had built up a reserve of N95 masks 
which we stored offsite. As this situation began to evolve early this summer, we 
recognized that we needed to expand this reserve order to include other protective gear 
including: surgical masks, gloves, procedure masks, hand sanitizer etc. We then began to 
work with our vendors to build up such a reserve. From my review of the units, it was 
also made clear to me that Materiel Services needed to implement a better process to 
manage the PAPR units and so we constructed a cart to hold the PAPR's and 
corresponding protective gear. Our Incident Management System group met almost daily 
for months. 
7. First, we partially activated the Incident Management System team according to 
federal Emergency Preparedness Guidelines. That group was in charge of identifying 
areas to work on and responsible individuals to work on those areas. The Incident 
Management System team coordinated efforts across the institution and managed 
communications. Second, the Incident Management System team identified the need to 
have a Staffing Plan. Third, the Staffing Team lead was tasked with responsibility to 
develop, coordinate and implement the staffing plan. Fourth, the Staffing Team lead 
gathered groups of stakeholders to design the plan. Various meetings were held. Fifth, 
regular meetings were held with the Incident Management System team to report on 
progress, troubleshoot, and make sure the plan met the needs of the institution. 
Question 7. Were EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDELINES, 
such as NIMS and ICS guidelines used to aid you in the preparation for this 
pandemic? If yes, how so? 
1. We kept the guidelines in mind for the process development. 
2. The main element of NIMS we used was the concept around central command and 
control. We discussed how information should flow and how the Staffing Team lead 
needed to ensure that sufficient data/information was relayed to them so they could 
appropriately interact with the Incident Commander or Disaster Command Center 
accordingly. 
3. Yes, our entire planning effort contemplated ICS as an overarching management tool. 
We went into a limited activation of our Incident Management System in June 2009 to 
effectively manage our continuing response. This plan served us very well. 
4. I didn't emergency preparedness planning guidelines in my planning, but I am sure 
"upstream" from me they were used. 
5. Yes, we utilized some of their processes. 
6. I have to say that I did not specifically use those tools in my preparation, although 
from being familiar with those tools, they probably influenced my actions. 
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7. We used Federal Emergency Preparedness Guidelines. This is common practice. All 
staff involved are trained in NIMS. 
Question 8: Planning literature has highlighted the importance of gaining a 
COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ENVIRONMENT and factors 
of the environment that surround the problem BEFORE creating a plan to solve the 
problem. Did our organization effectively identify environmental factors of the 
problem that would affect the plan?
2. Staff fears of contracting H1N1 and simply not showing up to work. 
The 80%+ female population in our environment who are primary caregivers at home, so 
sick children and/or closed schools could significantly affect our capabilities. 
3. Yes, the low-threshold and rapidly changing case definition caused large numbers of 
patients presenting to be placed into pandemic precautions. The potential for staff 
absences was also considered as a potential issue. High daily census in hospital facilities 
also posed major challenges. 
4. I think we did try to look at these types of factors.  
We anticipated fear of those not currently working in direct patient care suddenly 
working in this environment. We also talked about the heightened anxiety levels, and the 
need for ongoing support from EAP.  
We also discussed that not all departments were as forthcoming with available staff for 
reassignment when they were completing their Business Continuity Plans. This gave a 
distorted look at the resources that are available. 
5. Yes, community and staff responses were identified and addressed with ongoing 
information sharing. 
6. Much of our early work centered on how would we handle our own operations should 
we experience high absences due to our staff and their families being impacted by H1N1.  
 
As protective gear supplies became scarce and we had to conserve, naturally we were 
concerned about how this would be viewed by staff. 
7. The IMS group spent a significant amount of time understanding the ever changing 
environment. The IMS group used various sources of information, including Subject 
Matter Experts from the university, national groups like the CDC and OSHA, state and 
local groups like the state OSHA branch, the Health Department, professional groups like 
nurses and physicians associations, practices from peer institutions, and general public 
news sources like New York Times, CNN, etc. to understand the environment. 
With the information gathered, we developed assumptions about how our staffing could 
be impacted. These assumption included: % of staff that could become infected, time off 
work if infected, potential for school closings, spread of fear of infection that could result 
in absenteeism, potential for H1N1 and seasonal flu to show together, potential for 
waves. After all this we calculated up to 40% absenteeism in 12-week waves. 
Question 9: The planning literature emphasizes the importance of CLEAR 
PROBLEM DEFINITION. Did our organization properly define the problem 
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(staffing pandemic planning process)? When was this done?
1. I think this was done more on the staffing lead team level. 
2. Pandemic Staffing planning began several years ago, probably starting back in 2005 
when the worry was the "bird flu". We had some very high level discussions but given 
that nothing really materialized at that time, discussions were very high level. With the 
H1N1 flu, Pandemic staff planning began as soon as we heard the disease was present in 
Mexico and human-to-human transmission was occurring. 
3. Yes, we began working to implement our prior pandemic planning outcomes, and 
rapidly realized the adjustments that were needed, particularly in terms of patient 
placement in the hospitals. We also realized that real-time data about placement was a 
deficit that we had to rapidly address. Confirmatory testing to rule out H1N1 produced 
some challenges, since the rapid test had a high level of inaccuracy, and more definitive 
testing was badly bottlenecked. This had a relationship to demand for staff that were fit 
tested for the N-95 mask, and therefore qualified to care for H1N1 patients. 
4. I believe so. 
5. For most issues yes, although I believe occupancy management planning could have 
been more robust. 
6. The point I wish to make here is that to me the problem was regularly changing. By 
this I mean that the first wave of patients we saw were very critical and required intense 
care and ECMO. In the second wave, we saw more patients, but their physical condition 
was not as critical. 
7. Yes. For purposes of the staffing plan, we clearly defined the problem as "How to 
maintain essential operations while facing a potential 40% absenteeism rate". 
Question 10: The literature draws attention to the importance of PROVIDING 
ENOUGH DETAIL to properly understand the problem. Did the planning process 
include a great amount of detail? If yes, how was this done, and what did this look 
like?
2. We provided the following to departments: 
 
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PRIORITIES 
1. Safety of staff, faculty and patients 
2. Continuation of patient care within the concept of the greatest good for the greatest 
number 
3. Conservation and effective use of resources 
 
PLANNING PRINCIPLES 
1. Not business as usual: in the event of a pandemic or major disaster, some services will 
need to be stopped and others will be provided in a different manner. 
2. Plans should leverage existing resources and mechanisms. 
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3. Redeployment of staff should be done in a tiered manner: first redeploy within your 
own department, then redeploy to and from your partner departments/units and lastly 
pool from other internal/external resources (i.e. Labor Pool). 
4. Redeployment of staff will be balanced between the critical needs of your own 
department and the critical needs of other departments. 
5. Staff with clinical skills should be utilized in some clinical capacity. 
6. Internal staffing will be approached differently than external/volunteer staffing. 
 
WORKING ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Actual presentation of a pandemic may not be known in advance. High volumes of flu 
patients coming through clinics and ED, and/or direct transfer of patients with acute 
respiratory disorders coming into intensive care units can be expected. 
2. Event is expected to be a protracted with 12-week waves over several years. 
3. Staff absenteeism estimated at 30-40% due to sick staff, staff caring for family 
members, or fear of infection can be expected. 
3. Yes, previous patient placement plans turned out to be naive, in the face of the reality 
of nearly constant high census, with unoccupied beds a rarity. The number and 
distribution of fit tested staff, and the number of available Powered Air Purifying 
Respirators (PAPR's) presented significant challenges, so a number of things had to 
happen. Previous, incomplete data on fit tested personnel had to be augmented. PAPR 
management had to be centralized, and efforts instituted to obtain more PAPR's and 
masks in the face of national shortages and distribution restrictions. Fit testing resources 
were wholly inadequate, based on prior organizational inaction on the problem, and 
extreme measures had to be implemented to rise to the need, producing tremendous stress 
on both those performing the testing and those with a need to be tested. 
4. Yes- I think as much as we could anticipate. I know there were unanticipated 
challenges that arose which we should continue to work through... i.e. shortage of basis 
equipment (especially masks of all varieties), impact on the ICU staff on the types of 
patients affected and the severity of their illness, demands on ECMO staff and resources, 
affects of staff needing to wear the protective gear for hours at a time... 
5. The business continuity planning process was a huge undertaking that required many 
follow up steps. Staffing process was weak and needed more comprehensive planning 
6. The documents we prepared for how we would manage our operations were very 
detailed and then we got into specifics about how departments could collaborate to ensure 
continued service to our patients. Another point about detail is that in Materiel Services 
we maintained a daily log of key products showing how much was used, how many days 
of product we had on hand, etc. 
7. Yes, we provided a lot of detail to the institution to frame the situation. This allowed 
staff to understand what we were preparing for and how we were preparing. Planning for 
the pandemic required thinking outside the box and preparing to behave in ways we are 
not used to behaving. This required a lot of communication and detail to help people 
think differently. Many new guidelines had to be developed and others had to be 
modified to guide behavior. 
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Question 11: Research suggests that the EVALUATION OF SOLUTIONS prior to 
implementation assists planners to foresee potential problems, as well as to create 
solutions to these problems before they occur. Were solutions evaluated for 
effectiveness prior to implementation? If yes, what did this look like?
1. Yes, we identified limitations of the system we chose and continued to reevaluate those 
as we moved through the process. We understand that the current system is not a final 
solution and have made sure to keep track of the information that would help us in 
developing a long-term solution. We also met with Ambulatory Care Services to identify 
their experience during their brief flu clinic and identified common goals for a future 
solution. 
2. We performed "table top" exercises on our pandemic staffing process, to test our 
process and assumptions, and identify strengths and weaknesses in our plan. 
3. As much as possible, solutions were discussed by stakeholders who were involved in 
the planning process as the solutions were being prepared for implementation. The 
combination of the rapidity of developments, together with the large and complex nature 
of our organization made this process imperfect, and, at times, solutions had to be rolled 
out and tested immediately, with adjustments made after-the-fact. 
4. Yes, I think we tried to do some dry-run exercises. For example, I was able to witness 
a dry-run of using the Manpower software to handle unit requests for help. 
5. We planned to pilot a Scarce Resource allocation process, but it did not get off the 
ground due to lack of leadership follow through 
6. As we explored product substitution options, we evaluated our options for 
effectiveness. We looked at various scenarios to see how a product decision could impact 
other practices or products. 
7. Some aspects and solutions were piloted. For example, the process for managing 
staffing, called the Labor Pool was piloted. The process for allocating scarce resources 
was also piloted. Other emergency preparedness exercises were also held as part of our 
standard emergency preparedness plans. However, various things had to be implemented 
without being piloted due to timing. In those cases, we always made sure we had people 
who understood the issue and implications in the room making decisions.
Question 12: Did integral individuals to the planning process RECEIVE 
FEEDBACK on their work? If yes, how often did this occur? What did the feedback 
consist of?
1. This occurred on a monthly basis. The purpose of our monthly meetings was to gather 
feedback from essential personnel regarding the process and the system. Their feedback 
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was instrumental in getting the system up and running! 
2. Yes, via the table-top planning process. 
3. The revised plan, to include a patient placement algorithm, was worked on as a draft 
for several weeks, with testing and feedback based on real-time experience. At some 
point, we found a need to circulate the draft more broadly, and received additional 
anticipatory feedback from those not yet affected by the actual placement challenges. 
4. The meetings I attended were filled with a constant back-and-forth of feedback and 
ideas. 
5. Yes 
6. As part of the Incident Management System group, we played a key role in reviewing 
and evaluation department pandemic plans. Each one of us took a few plans, read them 
and then reported our findings. 
7. I do not recall a standard process for getting feedback along the way. However, we just 
had an internal debrief meeting where we all evaluated our planning process. 
Question 13: What components of the planning process do you think worked well?
1. I think the large group meetings in Human Resources, including representatives from 
Nursing and Ambulatory Care, were essential in helping us create a viable process. 
2. The Planning Principles, Working Assumptions, Limited Activation of Incident 
Command Structure, and Regular meetings of the leads for each of the various teams 
worked well. 
3. Having the prior planning from 2006 was very valuable. Even though imperfect, the 
efforts provided a good basis from which to refine existing plans to better ones. I credit 
both our physician and administrative leadership with having the foresight to have 
invested in the prior planning, which allowed us to react much more effectively when 
H1N1 arose as a specific issue. 
4. The concept of Business Continuity Plans. I cannot believe we didn't have these 
before. Those involved made the meetings and the work a priority. 
5. Incident Management System lead Team and Emergency Management planning 
groups were varied in their effectiveness, some were good. 
6. We had a core group of committed and creative individuals who came together to lead 
our efforts. 
7. Activation of the IMS team, Development of integrated plans, Update of Business 
Continuity Plans, and Assessment of the environment worked well. 
Question 14: What top three challenges did you face during the planning process?
1. Time. 
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Time. 
Time. 
2. Rapidly changing activities during the initial phases. 
Communicating the right information to staff. 
Not enough time. I just simply felt that there was not enough time to devote to all of the 
issues. 
3. 1. Adjusting our ability to rapidly and correctly identify cases, appropriately place and 
manage H1N1 patients 
2. Rapidly and exponentially increase our fit testing ability and level of fit tested faculty 
and staff to care for patients. 
3. Manage fair, equitable and effective distribution of vaccine, in the face of federal, state 
and local distribution schemes that were simply miserable and an incredible mismatch 
with our values in terms of protecting staff so that that could confidently continue to care 
for the public. 
4. Getting all of the players at the table in the beginning. There were some territory 
issues. 
6. 1. Product availability was a challenge. 
2. Government stockpiling of items such as needles and syringes significantly impact the 
supply chain/availability of certain products. We just recently have recovered from this. 
3. The changing needs to meet the needs of our patients. Again, in our pre-work we had 
built up a reserve of N95 masks, but in the first wave it was not N95 masks that were 
needed but rather PAPR machines. So we had to turn our focus to build up our PAPR 
inventories. In the wave that hit after that, PAPR's were not needed but more typical flu 
protective gear. 
7. Communication in ever changing environment 
Supply shortage 
Managing modification to standard practices 
Question 15: What parts of the planning process would you change?
2. Improve our Surveillance and identify the appropriate trigger. Even though we started 
planning once we heard about transmission, it still felt like we were behind. I believe that 
cases were occurring for sometime in Mexico before we took this planning process 
seriously. 
3. More facile and nimble ways to work in groups. In addition to face-to-face meetings, 
we used conference calling to good advantage. Future efforts might involve web 
conferencing as a better option, as the technology evolves and become more widely 
distributed and used. 
4. Being the health system that we are, we need to have ongoing preparation for 
catastrophic events. We need templates and processes that are reviewed annually. This 
was a huge wake-up call for us, and we better not hit the snooze! 
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5. Clarify accountability of the Leadership--there were tremendous gaps in the planning 
process that led to the initiation of an Incident Management System lead team. The 
Institutional Planning process needs to be evaluated. 
6. I established weekly conference calls with 4 of our key suppliers and manufacturers, 
but in hindsight I wish I had begun those earlier in the process. 
7. We need faster decision making, and to be more proactive and less reactive. 
Question 16: What was the process missing? 
1. This felt reactionary rather than proactive. My hope is that we will take the concerns 
over the process and system in Human Resources and make appropriate decisions for 
future pandemic related events. For example, if Ambulatory Care and OCA both need a 
pandemic system, we should all pool together to work on a common solution. Right now, 
we have retro-fitted ourselves into Manpower's system, but ultimately we need to address 
some very real issues; such as the need to upload data to the system rather than manual 
data entry, how often the data is refreshed, how often units have to revisit their plans and 
how to identify re-deployable employees, etc. 
3. In hindsight, we would move to the limited activation of our Incident Management 
System sooner. The discipline associated with this structure would have streamlined the 
earlier planning efforts once the threat emerged in April. 
4. Business Continuity Plans were an issue.  
Would like to see Human Resources manage a central process of ongoing creation of 
profiles of existing and new staff so that in the event of a catastrophe, we know who has 
transferrable skills to assist. 
5. Enough allocated staff support to manage the work of ongoing change management 
and PDCA. 
6. I would say we had things well covered 
7. Don’t know. 
Question 17: Is this plan adaptable to other hospitals? 
1. Right now, no. But I think we are on to something if we can gather our resources to 
create a new system. 
2. I think the Incident Management System and all plans developed by staffing, 
pathology, safety, etc are adaptable to other hospitals. It would simply be a matter of 
adjusting them for scale and size of event and hospital. 
3. Yes, we believe large and complex organizations might benefit from our experiences, 
and many of our plans might be adaptable to others. 
4. Yes. 
5. Not in the fashion we implemented it, there were tremendous gaps in the planning 
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process so we initiated the Incident Management System lead team. That means the 
current process we have is not working and nothing has been done regarding that. 
6. Yes. 
7. I believe it should be. 
Question 18: What advice would you give to other hospitals creating a disaster 
planning process? 
1. Be more proactive and research a system and process well before any looming 
pandemic or disaster. 
2. Identifying the "correct" leads for each team is important. You need individuals who 
not only know their business, but also can apply their thinking to a potential emergency 
situation and how might they adapt their plans. So someone who is not only competent in 
their daily work, but flexible and adaptable and has some knowledge of the Incident 
Management System. 
3. Engaging leadership in reinforcing the importance of the function, and having 
leadership set forth expectations for participation is invaluable. While it is easy to keep 
pushing such planning to the "back burner", advance planning is critical to effective 
performance when crises arise. Incorporating broad stakeholder involvement in planning 
is also very valuable. 
4. Start before the disaster. Don't shy away from getting downright meticulous about the 
details. I think we have a history of doing that and we still need to keep planning for what 
we can so that we can use our energies to work on solving what we can't plan or predict. 
6. Start early and have a strong leader. It seemed many organizations did not take this 
event seriously and so were caught scrambling. 
7. Plan ahead. In an emergency situation, there is no time to waste. 
Question 19: Are there any specific activities that pertain to the planning process 
that were not covered in the course of this interview? If yes, what were they?
4. Can’t think of any. 
6. No.
7. Don’t know.




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Appendix E 
 
Intake Script 
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Appendix F 
 
Labor Pool Operations 
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Appendix G 
 
Matching Process 
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Appendix H 
 
HR & Labor Pool Pandemic Operations 
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Appendix I 
 
UMHS Pandemic Planning Staffing & Labor Pool 
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Table 1 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model Citations: Anticipate 
Criterion: Determine Environmental Factors 
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
1. 
Administrative 
Lead 
Our entire planning effort contemplated ICS as an 
overarching management tool. We went into a 
limited activation of our Incident Management 
System in June 2009 to effectively manage our 
continuing response. This plan served us very well.  
2. 
Staffing Team 
Lead 
The main element of NIMS we used was the concept 
around central command and control. We discussed 
how information should flow and how the Staffing 
Team Lead needed to ensure that sufficient 
data/information was relayed to them so they could 
appropriately interact with the Incident Commander 
or Disaster Command Center accordingly.  
3. 
Project Manager 
of Staffing 
Pandemic Team 
The IMS group spent a significant amount of time 
understanding the ever-changing environment. The 
IMS group used various sources of information, 
including Subject Matter Experts from the 
university, national groups like the CDC and OSHA, 
state and local groups like the state OSHA branch, 
the Health Department, professional groups like 
nurses and physicians associations, practices from 
peer institutions, and general public news sources 
like New York Times, CNN, etc. to understand the 
environment.  
4. 
Staffing Team 
Lead 
We carefully evaluated how the community was 
reacting to the pandemic by reading newspapers, 
watching the news, etc.  
5.  
Administrative 
Lead 
The potential for staff absences was also considered 
as a potential issue. High daily census in hospital 
facilities also posed major challenges.  
6. 
Supply & 
Equipment 
Management 
Lead 
Much of our early work centered on how would we 
handle our own operations should we experience 
high absences due to our staff and their families 
being impacted by H1N1. 
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7.  
Staffing Team 
Lead 
(In regards to gaining a comprehensive 
understanding of the environment) Staff fears of 
contracting H1N1 and simply not showing up to 
work. The 80%+ female population in our 
environment who are primary caregivers at home, so 
sick children and/or closed schools could 
significantly affect our capabilities.  
8. 
Administrative 
Lead 
Having the prior planning from 2006 was very 
valuable. Even though imperfect, the efforts 
provided a good basis from which to refine existing 
plans to better ones. 
9. 
Volunteer Team 
Lead 
(In regards to business continuity plans) I can’t 
believe we didn’t have these before. 
Documents Document Title Entry 
10. 
Labor Pool 
Operations 
(Three phases of Labor Pool operations) Pre-Phase, 
Limited Phase, Full Phase.  
11. Task Calendar 
(Pandemic planning urgency level scale determines 
which job tasks are to be completed according to the 
urgency level scale.)  
12. Intake Script 
Obtain background on the situation that caused the 
need. 
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Table 2 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model Citations: Boundaries 
Criterion: Proper Problem Definition 
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
1. 
Project Manager 
of Staffing 
Pandemic Team 
For purposes of the staffing plan, we clearly defined 
the problem as "How to maintain essential 
operations while facing a potential 40% absenteeism 
rate".  
2. 
Nursing Services 
Lead 
(In regards to steps taken during the planning 
process) Identify problem to be solved.  
Documents Document Title Entry 
3. 
HR & Labor 
Pool Pandemic 
Operations 
The purpose (of this site) is to coordinate HSHR 
Labor Pool operations in the event of an emergency 
event such as a pandemic. In the event of the 
emergency, HSHR would be responsible for business 
continuity of existing critical HR functions, 
operating the organizational labor pool, and 
coordinating organizational staffing and personnel 
reporting.  
Criterion: Proper Problem Specificity  
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
4. 
Project Manager 
of Staffing 
Pandemic Team 
Planning for the pandemic required thinking outside 
the box and preparing to behave in ways we are not 
used to behaving. This required a lot of 
communication and detail to help people think 
differently.  
5. 
Supply & 
Equipment 
Management 
Lead 
The documents we prepared for how we would 
manage our operations were very detailed and then 
we got into specifics about how departments could 
collaborate to ensure continued service to our 
patients. 
6. Project Manager 
of Staffing 
We provided a lot of detail to the institution to frame 
the situation. This allowed staff to understand what 
we were preparing for and how we were preparing. 
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Pandemic Team Planning for the pandemic required thinking outside 
the box and preparing to behave in ways we are not 
used to behaving. This required a lot of 
communication and detail to help people think 
differently. Many new guidelines had to be 
developed and others had to be modified to guide 
behavior.  
7. 
Staffing Team 
Lead 
We divided (the work) into departments (and created 
planning principles). 
Documents Document Title Entry 
8. 
Labor Pool 
Operations 
(Regarding Full HR Labor Pool Operations 
Flowchart, describes the steps taken to deploy 
volunteers to assist in the hospital during an 
emergency event.)  
9. Intake Script 
(Guidelines when taking staffing requests from 
units) Ask questions regarding background, 
education and coaching, order detail, prioritization, 
take order, conduct matching.  
10. 
Department 
Specific Staffing 
Plan 
(Details the function triggers/dependencies, current 
performance standards, skill level required, and 
work redesign and redeployment strategies for each 
department.)  
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Table 3 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model Citations: Create Solutions 
Criterion: Generate Multiple Solutions 
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
1. 
Volunteer Team 
Lead 
The meetings I attended were filled with a constant 
back-and-forth of feedback and ideas. 
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Table 4 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model Citations: Design 
Criterion: Evaluation of solutions prior to implementation 
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
1. 
Human 
Resources 
Systems Lead 
We identified limitations of the system we chose and 
continued to reevaluate those as we moved through 
the process.  
2. 
Administrative 
Lead 
We found a need to circulate the draft more broadly, 
and received additional anticipatory feedback from 
those not yet affected by the actual placement 
challenges.  
Documents Document Title Entry 
3. 
Pandemic 
Planning 
Staffing & Labor 
Pool 
Pandemic Staffing Labor Plan depicted in 
conceptual process map form. 
4. 
Department 
Specific 
Pandemic 
Staffing Plan 
Tasks and duties ranked in order based upon 
criticality 
5. 
HR & Labor 
Pool Pandemic 
Operations 
Represents final Incident Action Plan created by 
health system. 
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Table 5 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model Citations: Execute 
Criterion: Evaluation of solutions prior to implementation 
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
1.  
Human 
Resources 
System Lead 
The final meeting was a run-through of the process 
and how to use the system by doing a sample order 
and match process.  
2. 
Staffing Team 
Lead 
We performed tabletop exercises on our pandemic 
staffing process to test our process and assumptions, 
and identify strengths and weaknesses in our plan.  
Documents Document Title Entry 
3. 
Emergency 
Management 
Event 
Lists the pandemic committees of the health system; 
one of which was the Training committee. 
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Table 6 
Emergency Preparedness Planning Model Citations: Feedback 
Criterion: Use of Feedback Loop 
Survey 
Responses Respondent Entry 
1. 
Staffing Team 
Lead 
(In regards to individuals receipt of feedback) Yes, 
via the table-top planning process.  
2. 
Volunteer Team 
Lead 
The meetings I attended were filled with a constant 
back-and-forth of feedback and ideas.  
Documents Document Title Entry 
3. 
Emergency 
Management 
Event 
(Critique document details objective, 
accomplishments, challenges, and improvements for 
several hundred tasks regarding emergency 
planning.) An exercise critique meeting was held on 
Tuesday March, 8, 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                    93 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Deming’s Plan-Do-Check-Act-Cycle (Deming, 1982) 
Figure 2. Kepner-Tregoe Problem Solving Cycle (Kepner & Tregoe, 1965) 
Figure 3. Sample Haddon Matrix (Haddon, 1968) 
Figure 4. Organization Chain of Command Emergency Reporting Chart 
Figure 5. Proposed Pandemic Planning Model 
Figure 6. Proposed Pandemic Planning Process Map 
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Check-Act-Cycle (Deming, 1982).
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Figure 3. Sample Haddon Matrix (Haddon, 1968).
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Figure 4. Organization Chain of Command Emergency Reporting Chart. 
 
STAFFING A MAJOR                                                                                                    98 
 
Figure 5. Proposed Emergency Preparedness Planning Model. 
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